THEORETICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY
The Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology

APA Division 24
Midwinter Meeting Program
Atlanta, Georgia
March 6-8, 2014
Program and Organizing Committee

Joshua Clegg, John Jay College, CUNY (Co-chair)

Joseph Ostenson, University of Tennessee at Martin (Co-chair)

Jeff Reber, Brigham Young University

Brady Wiggins, Brigham Young University, Idaho

Kareen Malone, University of West Georgia

Mark Freeman, College of the Holy Cross

Lisa Osbeck, University of West Georgia

Jordan Hyde, Brigham Young University
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Dear Colleagues,

On behalf of the executive committee of the Society for Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology I am delighted to welcome you to our second annual midwinter meeting. We meet for the first time in beautiful Atlanta, Georgia, a city rich in history, culture, and cuisine. I hope you will take some time to read through the “Welcome to Atlanta” section of this pamphlet and familiarize yourself with some of the great restaurants and historical sights you might want to visit during your free time. I also want to extend a special thanks to our site hosts, Kareen Malone, Lisa Osbeck, Jonathan Gibson, Christine Wright, and Chase O’Gwin for their research, preparations, and hard work that have made this conference a truly hospitable and enjoyable event.

As our schedule of presentations shows, our program this year is filled with a variety of interesting and informative topics and presentation formats. We are pleased to have so many 1st time presenters this year, especially those who are new student affiliates and early career psychologists. We encourage you to attend their presentations and show them your support. I would also like to highlight several special sessions and features of the conference this year:

• The Interactive Poster Session (Saturday, 9:30-10:50) continues to be a favorite session of the conference. We have several excellent posters this year and we encourage you to come and interact with the presenters as they discuss their research.
• Last year, Blaine Fowers initiated a wonderful tradition in which we celebrate a book that has been published by one of our Society members during the last year. This year we are pleased to celebrate Mark Freeman’s excellent book, The Priority of the Other, with a panel of discussants who will comment on Mark’s book. Please join the celebration Thursday evening, from 5-6:00.
• In addition to our general social hour we have scheduled Student Affiliate and Early Career Psychologist socials during the Thursday and Friday lunch hours respectively. Members of the executive committee will be in attendance and topics of unique importance to students and ECPs will be discussed. I look forward to meeting with each of you.

• Several conversation hours have been scheduled in a hospitality suite to allow for informal, more intimate discussions of topics and issues of interest to members of the society. We hope you will join the conversations!

• John Christopher, a past-president of the society and expert in meditation and mindfulness practices will host a morning mindfulness and meditation session on Friday from 7:30-8:50. We encourage you to start your day off right by attending this session.

I want to express my appreciation to our program co-chairs, Joseph Ostenson and Joshua Clegg, for their excellent work on the program and for their creativity in generating a variety of activities and events to meet the different needs and interests of a diverse and growing society.

I also want to thank each of you for attending this conference and for your support of this society. We have a great community here and that is primarily due to the members who cultivate community through service, passion, and vision. I am pleased to know you and to count myself one among you.

Jeff Reber, President
## Thursday, March 6

### 8:30 – 9:50 a.m.

**Outside Phoenix**

**Registration**

### 10:00 – 10:50 a.m.

**Phoenix II-III**

**Paper Session**

- Does psychology’s use of the concept of probability deny human agency? *Kieran O’Doherty*

- The moral dilemma of reading fiction, *Christopher H. Ramey*

**Buckhead**

**Symposium: The missing dimension of tragic vision**

- The Gift of Tragedy, *Mark Freeman*

- Tragic Vision, *Frank Richardson & Robert Bishop*

- An ontological explication of two approaches to suffering, *Brent D. Slife*

### 11:00 – 11:50 a.m.

**Phoenix II-III**

**Interactive Session: Mind the gap: Navigating the distance between theoretical psychology and behavioral business ethics**

- Interviewee, *Richard Williams*

- Interviewer, *M-C Ingerson*

**Buckhead**

**Paper Session**

- Alfred North Whitehead and the task for Twenty-first Century psychology, *Patrick M. Whitehead*

- Supervenience and psychiatry: Are mental disorders brain disorders?, *Charles M. Olbert & Gary J. Gala*

### 12:00 – 12:30 p.m.

**Phoenix I**

**Student Affiliate Social**

### 12:30 – 1:20 p.m.

**Buckhead**

**Conversation Hour: Moral questions in psychology**
### Thursday, March 6 (Continued)

#### 1:30 – 2:50 p.m.

**Phoenix II-III**

**Symposium: Toward a moral psychology worthy of its name: Three questions and a proposal**

- Reflections on the boundaries of morality in moral psychology, *Austen Anderson*
- Cutting the proverbial cord: A call for transparent non-neutrality in moral psychology, *Jordan Ainsley*
- Morality without agency? Examining the neglect of agency in contemporary moral theories, *Tyler Lefevor*
- A moral psychology worthy of its name must be extensive, agentic, and committed, *Blaine Fowers*

**Buckhead**

**Symposium: Real lives, extraordinary acts: comparison of evolving systems and life positioning analysis**

- The evolution of evolving systems, *Michael Hanchett Hanson*
- Not “just” a comedian: A case study of John Stewart, *April Nickell*
- Respondent, *Jack Martin*

#### 3:00 – 3:50 p.m.

**Phoenix II-III**

**Paper Session**

- Obsession, technology, and the modern subject, *John L. Roberts*
- Transformational-transformative ontology: Self-choreographed dancing of the psychological kinds, *Aydan Gülerce*

**Buckhead**

**Paper Session**

- Atoms, qualia, and the current status of physicalism, *Martin E. Morf*
- What does the body know? Towards a redefinition of interoceptive awareness, *Jonathan Gibson*
Thursday, March 6 (Continued)

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| 4:00 – 4:50 p.m. | Phoenix II-III | **Interactive Session**     | HaraQueen: Donna Haraway, Alexander McQueen, and critical psychology, *Jacob W. Glazier*  
Somatic narrative: impact: An exploration of the physical impact of words, *C. Catherine Mellor, Ben Arcangeli, Rachel Carbonara, Adeline Dettor, David Goodman, & Danielle Moreno* |
Ethics and embodiment: Re-evaluating the role of the body in ethical development, *John C. Christopher* |
| 5:00 – 6:00 p.m. | Phoenix II-III | **Book Discussion Session**   | Mark Freeman’s *The Priority of the Other*, *Discussants:* *David Goodman, Frank Richardson, Bradford J. Wiggins, Fernando Quigua; Chair: Joshua Clegg* |
### Friday, March 7

#### 7:30 – 8:50 a.m.

| Phoenix II-III | **Society Executive Committee Meeting** |
| Phoenix I | **Morning Mindfulness and Meditation Session**, *John Christopher* |

#### 9:00 – 9:50 a.m.

| Phoenix II-III | **Presidential Address** |
| | There is nothing more practical than a good theoretical and philosophical psychology, *Jeffrey S. Reber, President, Division 24* |

#### 10:00 – 10:50 a.m.

| Phoenix II-III | **Symposium: Self-determination theory: A critical analysis** |
| | Self-determination theory: A critical analysis, *Wanda Power*  
| | Discussant, *Jack Martin*  
| Buckhead | **Paper session** |
| | Ethical epistemic methodology in the social sciences, *Chase O’Gwin & Ron Hopkins*  
| | Using systematic review methods for topics in philosophical and theoretical psychology, *Paul Fehrmann & Edith Sicken* |

#### 11:00 – 11:50 a.m.

| Phoenix II-III | **Symposium: Selling a bill of “goods”: Science, marketing, and human identity** |
| | Presenters, *David M. Goodman, Sam Gable, Katie Howe, David House*  
| Buckhead | **Paper Session** |
| | Clinical Zizek: The emancipatory act in the treatment hour, *Dan Rose*  
| | Historical critiques and current re-emergences of symbolic interactionism, *Richard E. La Fleur & Christina L. Wright* |
Friday, March 7 (Continued)

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<td>Early Career Psychologists Social</td>
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<td>Conversation Hour: Theory and Practice</td>
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<td>1:30 – 2:50 p.m.</td>
<td>Phoenix II-III</td>
<td>Symposium: Explicating the psychological, embodied, and institutional machinery of industrial higher education</td>
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- Industrialization in higher education, *Joseph A. Ostenson, Joshua W. Clegg & Bradford J. Wiggins*
- “Variable psychology” and assessment: A critical analysis of presupposed “standards” in education practice, *Chris Head*
- The mechanization of experience: Industrialism’s effect on affect, imagination, and psychological knowledge, *Fernando Quigua*
- Richard Williams, *Discussant*

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<td>Paper Session</td>
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- Dialectic of character, *Victor Clark (aka Peter)*
- An epistemology and ontology of dialogue, *James M. Nelson*
- Ideas for teaching theoretical and philosophical psychology in a small, rural, southeast college, *Samuel D. Downs*
**Friday, March 7 (Continued)**

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<td>3:00 – 3:50 p.m.</td>
<td>Phoenix II-III</td>
<td><strong>Paper Session</strong>&lt;br&gt;The potential of philosophical discourse toward the assessment and management of suicide risk, <em>Robyn R. Gaier</em>&lt;br&gt;Re-imagining maternal care in human development from birth to death: Ground for ethical provision, <em>Mary Beth Morrissey &amp; Frederick J. Wertz</em></td>
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<td>Buckhead</td>
<td><strong>Panel Session: Spinoza and Qualitative Research</strong>&lt;br&gt;Presenters, <em>Christopher Biase, Timothy Beck, &amp; Emaline Freidman</em></td>
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<td>4:00 – 4:50 p.m.</td>
<td>Phoenix II-III</td>
<td><strong>Symposium: On rethinking our God conflict</strong>&lt;br&gt;Benefits of a thoroughgoing theistic approach to psychology, <em>Chauncy T. Brinton</em>&lt;br&gt;A workable conception of God for psychological science, <em>Gregg Henriques</em></td>
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<td>Buckhead</td>
<td><strong>Paper Session</strong>&lt;br&gt;Psychotherapies as language-games, <em>Pavan Brar</em>&lt;br&gt;Narrative and unfusible horizons: Towards a deliberately interventionist moral psychology, <em>Sam Gable, David Goodman, Rachel Carbona &amp; David House</em></td>
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<td>5:00 – 5:50 p.m.</td>
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<td><strong>Conversation Hour: Politics of standardization in education, science, and practice</strong></td>
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### Saturday, March 8

#### 8:30 – 9:20 a.m.

**Phoenix I**

**Conversation Hour: Theoretical Frontiers in Consciousness Studies**

#### 9:30 – 10:50 a.m.

**Phoenix II-III**

**Poster Session**

- Cinema and multi-layered structure of reality, *Robert Beshara*

- Necessary containment: Belief, morality, and the good-enough theory, *David A. House, David Goodman, C. Catherine Mellor, Abigail Collins & Sam Gable*

- Reintegration and mattering: Post-deployment and veterans, *Richard E. La Fleur*

- Psychology of authenticity: A phenomenological anastomosis of the experience of a transition to an authentic human life, *Kizito N. C. Okeke*

- Engaging CTE in the lived experience of the athlete’s career transition, *Gary Senecal*

- An exploration of theories of legitimization through discussions on sexual orientation, *Christina L. Wright*
Saturday, March 8 (Continued)

11:00 a.m. – 12:30 p.m.

Phoenix II-III

Symposium: Combating the STEM by bridging psychology and the humanities in the classroom

The demons that inhabit the human breast: Psychoanalysis in Virgil and the English classroom, *John Glass*

Rescue 911: How literature can save psychology students from neuroscience and further compartmentalization, *Michelle Merwin*

Mental disorders and aesthetics: Franz Kafka’s and Charlotte Perkins Gillman’s literary prognosis for depression, *Charles Bradshaw*

Discussant, *Ed Gantt*

Buckhead

Paper session

Can psychology be both unified and multicultural?, *Jordan Hyde*

An integrative meta-theoretical framework for psychology, *Gregg Henriques*

12:30 – 12:50 a.m.

Phoenix II-III

Closing Remarks, Jeffrey S. Reber
Abstracts

Thursday, March 6, 10:00 a.m.

Does psychology’s use of the concept of probability deny human agency?

Kieran O’Doherty, University of Guelph

Probability is a central concept in the epistemological foundation of psychology. It is also used routinely in operationalising studies and in formulating psychological knowledge claims. In spite of this, the interpretation of the concept is contested (O’Doherty, 2005). Arguments about probability are carried out on an ontological level, as in debates between Bayesians and frequentists (e.g., Jaynes, 2003), and with regard to whether probabilistic claims can or should be “content-blind” (Vranas; Gigerenzer). Psychology has also been criticised for conflating different senses of probability (Lamiell, 2011; O’Doherty, 2007), and these criticisms serve as a foundation for challenging the epistemic soundness of entire programs or fields within the discipline (e.g., personality psychology – Lamiell, 2011; risk communication – O’Doherty, 2006). In this session, I would like to raise for discussion a further problem that follows from theoretically uninformed uses of the concept of probability relating to the issue of human agency. In particular, I refer to conflation between demographic prevalence of a phenomenon or behaviour and probabilistic claims regarding the likelihood of any particular individual manifesting the phenomenon/behaviour. This conflation is related to problems associated with the use of single-event probabilities (Gigerenzer, 2002), and conflation between subjective and frequentist interpretations of probability (Lamiell, 2011). My argument is as follows: when researchers observe some behaviour in the population it may be appropriate to associate the prevalence of this behaviour with particular demographic categories. However, psychologists (and other researchers) tend not to report their observations in terms of the prevalence (or frequency) of the behaviour; rather, they tend to frame claims in terms of the probability of the behaviour manifesting for a particular individual or group. For example, we might observe that ADHD is more commonly diagnosed in boys than in girls. An associated probabilistic claim would be that boys are more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD than girls (or that a particular individual is more likely to be diagnosed compared to the average population likelihood based solely on the fact that he is a boy).

The implications for human agency become obvious when considering some of the behaviours that are typically studied by health psychologists, such as smoking, alcohol consumption, and dietary habits. These behaviours are often examined by documenting the prevalence of the behaviour relative to certain demographic categories. This information is often reported as a probability, such as “African Americans are more likely to smoke” or “men are more likely to engage in high risk behaviours”. Arguably, these kinds of statements seem to imply that:

1. the demographic category chosen by the researcher for analysis is necessarily relevant to understanding the prevalence of the phenomenon
2. the behaviour is caused at least in part by the individual belonging to that particular demographic category.

I argue that statements of this kind also deny human agency in that human behaviour is implicitly characterised as an effect caused by demographic characteristics.

The Moral Dilemma of Reading Fiction

Christopher H. Ramey, University of Kansas

We are social creatures. It is no surprise then that a major activity of our lives is reading about the lives of real and fictional others. Indeed, when one reads, for example a goal-related or action-related sentence, the part of the brain that would normally activate with
SYMPOSIUM: The Missing Dimension of Tragic Vision in Psychology
The papers in this program discuss the lack of what Miguel de Unamuno famously called a “tragic sense of life” in modern culture and the fields of psychology and psychotherapy. They explore ways that a credible notion of tragic vision or tragic realism might help us speak to prominent failings of modern psychology identified by theoretical psychologists and others.

The Gift of Tragedy
Mark Freeman, College of the Holy Cross
This paper explores the fact that tragic, even catastrophic, circumstances frequently open up regions of knowing, feeling, and being that might otherwise remain closed. Unbidden and unsought, tragedy may thus be seen as a kind of “gift,” calling forth our very humanity. In this respect, “The Missing Dimension of Tragic Vision in Psychology” represents a large and deeply problematic omission, one that perpetuates a much-diminished image of the human condition. Drawing on works ranging from Gabriel Marcel’s Tragic Wisdom and Beyond to Christian Wiman’s more recent My Bright Abyss: Meditation of a Modern Believer, I aim to underscore both the relevance of tragic vision for theoretical and philosophical psychology and the challenge of fashioning a philosophical anthropology adequate to the gift tragedy frequently provides.

Tragic Vision
Frank C. Richardson, University of Texas; Robert C. Bishop, Wheaton College
It is illuminating to view many of the shortcomings of 20th and 21st psychology and psychotherapy noted by theoretical psychologists and other critics—including a naive scientism, a one-sided individualism, the tendency to abet a “culture of narcissism,” and others—as resulting from a lack of what Miguel de Unamuno famously called a “tragic sense of life.” Drawing on the ideas of diverse thinkers such as Unamuno, Terry Eagleton, Karl Jaspers, Wendy Farley, Philip Cushman, William Connolly, and others, this paper sketches a
An ontological explication of two approaches to suffering

Brent Slife, Brigham Young University

I would like to do an ontological explication (for lack of a better term) of the notion of tragic vision, an important alternative to the classical theodicies of suffering. I will attempt to apply this explication to the existential suffering inherent in interpersonal love and caring. This explication will entail contrasting at least two types of ontology, abstractionism (with a prominent sub-species, liberal individualism) and strong relationality, with classical theodicies resulting from the former and tragic vision resulting from the latter.

Thursday, March 6, 11:00 a.m.

Mind the Gap: Navigating the distance between theoretical psychology and behavioral business ethics

M-C Ingerson & Richard Williams, Brigham Young University

When entering (or exiting) trains in Great Britain, an automated warning voice sounds reminding the enterprising passengers to ‘mind the gap’. The ‘gap’ referred to is the problematic space between the station platform and the floorboard of the train. Similarly, the authors of this proposal have noticed that there is a gap that needs minding between popular psychological theories and common organizational practices. If navigated without care, this gap can trip up the uninformed scholar who is honestly seeking to traverse the distance from the platform of good theory to the train of valid research, and subsequently on to best practices in everyday life. As such, the authors propose to share some of their most interesting and relevant experiences, both good and bad, of navigating the gap between theoretical psychology and behavioral business ethics.

To accomplish this goal the authors propose an alternative approach to the typical paper or panel presentation. Instead, the authors propose to carry out an old-fashioned interview between a young business ethics scholar and a senior academic in theoretical psychology. That way, the authors can carry out a dialogue in much the same way that most collaborative relationships unfold between scholars of different disciplines who learn that they’re both striving to better understand a scientific phenomenon in common. Once this question-and-answer driven dialogue is finished, the co-authors will then engage with the session attendees similarly and address any questions, comments, or concerns that they might have thought of during the interview.

This proposal benefits the attendees because: 1) it exposes some of the highs and lows to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary pursuits at low cost to those who might be considering such a path; 2) it demonstrates one way that theoretical psychologists can have a real impact on academic research and practical disciplines outside of traditional psychotherapy; and, 3) it provides special access to some of the most innovative research being done by a respected scholar in the field of theoretical psychology towards the end of his career. We anticipate that we will need 50 minutes for this session. We look forward to this dialogue being one of the highlights of our midwinter meeting!

Alfred North Whitehead and the Task for Twenty-First Century Psychology

Patrick M. Whitehead, University of West Georgia

This paper is in support of an approach to psychological inquiry that avoids what Alfred North Whitehead has termed a “vicious bifurcation.” Beginning with Plato, it has been customary (and even encouraged) to divide Nature into opposites—mind and body, substance and form,
intellectual and real, subject and object, etc. This, Whitehead observes, is unavoidable; *Natura naturans* and *Natura naturata* together comprise Nature. The early project of psychology demonstrates this nicely—James (1899) and Wundt (1897) both propose inner and outer psychologies as well as emphasizing their interaction. Moreover, each warns against the preoccupation with the “outer” which was common practice at the time. The problem only begins when either side of the dualism is privileged over the other—this is when Nature is “viciously bifurcated.” I argue that psychology has twice committed a “vicious bifurcation” of its subject matter. The first has favored material objectivity and has been presented by Toullin and Leary (1985) as the “cult of empiricism.” The behaviorism of Watson (1930) is an example of this. Watson relegates “consciousness” to the mystical realm of “superstition” and “voodoo.” The second “vicious bifurcation” in psychology might be called the “cult of humanism.” Here, humanists maintain that Wundt’s “experiencing subject” and “objects of experience” are actually two sides of the same coin. Supported by the mid-century continental and analytic schools of philosophy, the humanists are ever anxious to avoid the misguided position of naïve realism. Like “consciousness” to Watson, humanists in principle deny the possibility of naïve realism, chalking this assumption up to scientific immaturity (Maslow, 1966). What is called for is a language that recognizes the breadth of the project of psychology—one that allows for the discrete mechanisms of the empiricists as well as the sophisticated systems of the humanists. More importantly, it will allow for that which a “viciously bifurcated” project does not—the interactions between mechanisms and systems. Examples are provided for what this might look like.

**Supervenience and Psychiatry: Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?**

*Charles M. Olbert, Fordham University; Gary J. Gala, UNC School of Medicine*

Contemporary medical models of psychiatry rely on a Neo-Kraepelinian conception of mental disorders that involve a commitment to identifying mental disorders with brain disorders. Although these medical models cite empirical grounds for this identification, the claim that mental disorders are brain disorders ultimately represents a philosophical position that transcends currently available empirical evidence. Because the claim that mental disorders are brain disorders has important implications for education and research, the conceptual coherence of this claim ought to be carefully scrutinized. Conceptual tools in the philosophy of mind—in particular, the concepts of type identity, token identity, and supervenience—were designed for just this purpose. We identify supervenience as a key concept in arguments for or against the claim that mental disorders are brain disorders: by definition, a mental disorder supervenes on a brain disorder when there could be no change in the mental disorder without a change in the brain disorder. We focus on supervenience because any robust claim that mental disorders are brain disorders logically requires, at a minimum, that mental disorders supervene on brain disorders: in other words, any identity between mental and brain disorders (or states) logically entails a supervenience relation.

Moving beyond the basic conceptual issues, we apply the concept of supervenience to mental disorders as broadly understood in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual* (DSM-5), and we provide example supervenience analyses to three specific DSM-5 disorders: Alzheimer’s disease, specific phobia, and personality disorders. We find that certain psychiatric disorders are more amenable to supervenience explanations than others. Proposals to replace DSM-5 diagnostic categories with classifications stemming from basic neurobiology are also considered, and it is argued that at least some mental disorder symptoms cannot be separable from their putative underlying pathology so as to warrant the claim that mental disorders are brain disorders. Because it cannot be true that a psychiatric disorder is a brain disorder in cases where supervenience fails, this analysis provides philosophical grounds for Jaspers’ (1913) claim that there exists intrinsic heterogeneity within the subject matter of psychiatry (and thus related mental health disciplines), with some
disorders more intimately related to brain dysfunction and others that are more intrinsically mental or social. A unitary, one-size-fits-all approach to psychiatric disorders therefore ignores critical distinctions within the basic ontology of the discipline’s subject matter.

Thursday, March 6, 1:30 p.m.

SYMPOSIUM: Toward a Moral Psychology Worthy of Its Name: Three Questions and a Proposal

Moral psychology is an essential component for a number of disciplines, including moral philosophy, social, developmental, personality, and evolutionary psychology, and moral education. Ideally, the subdiscipline of moral psychology would bring clarity and order to important questions about human morality. Unfortunately, contemporary moral psychology theories tend to be based on implicit, partial, and poorly founded moral commitments that are disguised by ostensibly neutral scientific language. In the “post-Kohlbergian” era, there are three significant psychological approaches to morality: Moral Foundation Theory, social cognitive domain theory, and theorists of moral identity or moral personality. These theoretical approaches operate almost entirely independently, undermining the cumulative development of moral psychology theory. For these reasons, moral psychology is unable to provide the kind of guidance scholars and practitioners need for their work in the moral domain.

In this symposium, the presenters will argue that an adequate moral psychology must be capable of providing cogent answers to three essential questions. The first three presenters will examine how the three prominent approaches to moral psychology address three questions: First, what is the domain of moral psychology? Inconsistent views about the domain of the subdiscipline sow confusion and create pointless debate. Second, what is the role of agency in human morality? Moral psychologists are bafflingly silent on this core question. Third, to what extent do theorists claim moral neutrality about their own work? Moral psychologists tend to incompatibly claim moral neutrality while also making substantive moral claims. The fourth presenter will outline an Aristotelian alternative that provides answers to the three questions that deepen moral psychology and make it a more progressive resource for moral theory and practice because it offers a rich, compelling account of the good life for human beings. This symposium is part of a subdiscipline developing project by theoretical psychologists.

Reflections on the Boundaries of Morality in Moral Psychology

Austen Anderson, University of Miami

There is much disagreement among the three major theories of moral psychology regarding what makes up the moral domain. The social-cognitive domain theorists have a succinct definition of morality that is summed up as justice, rights, and welfare. This formulation has its roots in a combination of Kohlberg’s focus on the cognitive understanding of justice and Gilligan’s backing of care as the foundation of morality. They distinguish the moral domain sharply from conventional norms and personal decision making. Researchers in the moral identity group find themselves without a consistent or unifying understanding of the domain of morality. Most follow the path laid out by Turiel and the other neo-Kohlbergians in defining morality as being based on general considerations of welfare and justice. Others branch out to include other moral concepts such as bravery or use pro-social behaviors as a guide. A primary thrust of Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory has been a critique of previous theorizing for defining morality too narrowly. He argues that the narrowness of the moral domain has been a product of the narrowness of the personal moral domain of social scientists. Justice and care are the most important moral domains for Western, liberal, educated social scientists, whereas it is more common throughout the world to attend to other domains in making moral judgments. He describes these as
authority/subversion, loyalty/betrayal, and sanctity/degradation. The effort (or lack thereof) of these theorists to create a coherent formulation of the moral domain reveals the fragmented state of the subdiscipline of moral psychology. We wish to draw attention to these implicit and explicit assumptions about morality because arriving at a reasonable degree of consensus on the domain that we want to study is a necessary precondition for adequate theory, research, and practice.

Morality without Agency? Examining the Neglect of Agency in Contemporary Moral Theories

Tyler Lefever, University of Miami

Contemporary theories of moral psychology exhibit a surprising lack of discourse of key issues in the field. In this presentation, I discuss what the three major theoretical perspectives do and do not say about what role agency has in morality. I begin by clarifying that the study of morality requires a clear and explicit agentic framework. After discussing the nature of agency, I examine the way that each perspective attempts to account for agency. Although the perspectives vary in the way they account for agency, it remains oddly implicit in all three perspectives. Supporters of Moral Foundations Theory tend to focus on the automaticity of moral intuitions, which guide moral behavior. Moral Foundations theorists allow for the possible effect of reasoned persuasion on moral intuitions, but this link is strongly deemphasized. Social Cognitive Domain Theory often addresses agency implicitly in assigning responsibility for just or unjust acts. Domain theorists explicitly discuss agency in the personal domain, which they see as separate from morality. This move implicitly frames morality as overriding personal freedom, but they leave it unclear if this act is performed intentionally by a moral agent. Moral identity scholars are surprisingly silent on agency. They seem to agree that a person has responsibility for his or her moral identity, but they have surprisingly little to say about what that responsibility looks like or how it can be fulfilled. After examining each of the major perspectives, I compare and contrast their treatment of agency, concluding that all three perspectives have conflicted notions of the role of agency in morality that often do not align with their espoused convictions. Better understanding of these issues both within each theory and across theories indicates pathways for enhancing conceptual clarity and theory building.

Cutting the Proverbial Cord: A Call for Transparent Non-neutrality in Moral Psychology

Jordan Ainsley, University of Miami

This presentation poses a key moral question for theorists of moral psychology: To what extent do theorists claim moral neutrality about their own work? The quixotic goal of objectively detached, value-neutral observation and theory are strangely valued in the domain of moral psychology, where it is uniquely incompatible with the subject matter.

The claim to moral neutrality is sometimes explicitly stated, but more often implicitly suggested. Moral Foundation Theory oscillates between ostensibly non-normative abstract theorizing and neuroscience, on the one hand, and efforts to identify five universal domains for human morality, on the other. Although they acknowledge that these universal foundations are shaped by culture, these theorists are not neutral about harm, fairness, loyalty respect, and purity. Moral identity theorists are also inclined to write in the value-eliding language of psychological science. Yet they also espouse an explicitly optimal portrayal of moral development and often promote the ideal of a unity of concern for self and others as the single and synergetic outcome of moral development. Similarly, social cognitive domain theorists conduct empirical research on individuals’ moral versus non-moral actions from an ostensibly arms-length, detached position. Nevertheless, they clearly advocate for justice and beneficence. They typically resolve this contradiction by disguising their moral commitments through attributing the moral claims to their research participants.
Moral psychologists’ commitments to specific definitions of morality, whether implicit or stated, render any pretense of moral neutrality patently false. The vacillation between the morally detached language of psychological science and clear moral claims is inconsistent and implies an illusory scientific basis for their moral claims.

Far from advocating moral neutrality in moral psychology, I suggest that an adequate moral psychology is predicated on theorists clarifying and making explicit the moral commitments that animate their work so that those commitments can be scrutinized and improved.

**A Moral Psychology Worthy of Its Name Must be Extensive, Agentic, and Committed**

*Blaine Fowers, University of Miami*

The preceding presentations described the shortcomings in the responses of the three primary theoretical perspectives in moral psychology to three essential questions for the subdiscipline. This presentation will describe and defend Aristotle’s cogent, systematic, and illuminating answers to the questions at the core of moral psychology. First, in dramatic contrast to most contemporary views of the moral domain that focus only on right action in interpersonal contexts, Aristotle viewed the entirety of human activity as moral. The coextensivity of human action and morality is a result of framing morality as the pursuit of eudaimonia or the human good. Because all activity aims at something deemed worthwhile (whether well- or ill-foundedly) by the actor, there is no non-moral activity. Rather, all actions have a moral aspect. This feature of Aristotle’s ethics is most similar to Moral Foundation Theory, but that theory does not have the integrating concept of the human good. Second, it is obvious that human actors seek different goods, which makes it clear that agency is central to Aristotle’s ethics. Unlike contemporary moral psychologists, Aristotle is not committed to a metaphysics in which all events are expected to be explained by physical causality. Rather, he sees human action as explainable in terms of the reasons or ends for the sake of which an individual acts. This unambiguous teleology contrasts sharply with the vacillation between notions of freedom and determinism in contemporary theories of moral psychology. Third, Aristotle views the human good as the excellent expression of human nature, which is known as the function argument. The inseparability of human nature and the human good obviates any attempt at moral neutrality and suggests that the detached objectivity about morality found in moral psychology is deeply misguided. That is, moral psychology must make moral commitments.

**SYMPOSIUM: Real lives, extraordinary acts: Comparison of evolving systems and life positioning analysis**

*Respondent: Jack Martin, Simon Fraser University*

This symposium facilitates a dialogue between two approaches for studying the lives of people who accomplish extraordinary things: the evolving systems approach to case study method and Life Positioning Analysis (LPA) as an application of Position Exchange Theory (PET).

The evolving systems approach (Gruber & Davis, 1988; Gruber, 1989, Gruber & Wallace, 1999) builds on Piagetian principles of development, but applies those principles to lifespan development of non-normative – creative – work. The individual is seen as a unique developing system, guided by his or her own emergent sense of purpose and working within specific sociocultural contexts. Evolving systems has contributed to the psychology of creativity, as well as to scholarship on the lives of Charles Darwin, Benjamin Franklin, Vincent van Gogh, Henry Wordsworth, Michael Faraday, Bernard Shaw and Dorothy Richardson, among others.

Life Positioning Analysis has developed from the theories of George Herbert Mead and examines the “development of personhood through embodied, situated participation in
social interactions with objects and with others” (Martin, 2011, p. 1). LPA has also been used to analyze the lives of eminent individuals with extraordinary accomplishments, such as Jim Thorpe, Ernest Becker and Nelson Mandela. Whereas evolving systems includes social context but emphasizes cognitive factors, LPA includes cognitive factors but emphasizes social interactions. The emergence of sense of self and purpose are important to both approaches. In other words, these two holistic approaches to understanding lifespan development and extraordinary accomplishment may be complementary in important ways.

During this symposium Michael Hanchett Hanson will present a theoretical overview of evolving systems and suggest similarities and differences in comparison to Life Positioning Analysis. Then April Nickell will present an example of an evolving systems case, an analysis of the work of Jon Stewart, host of The Daily Show. Dr. Jack Martin, who has developed LPA and along with Alex Gillespie (Martin & Gillespie, 2010) defined PET, will respond to the papers, facilitating what we hope will be rich discussion among presenters and audience.

The Evolution of Evolving Systems
Michael Hanchett Hanson, Columbia University

The evolving systems approach was developed by Howard E. Gruber, as a method for studying long-term creative work. Gruber contended that creativity is not a trait or formulaic process, but a purpose-driven commitment to change, a kind of work. Hallmarks of the evolving systems approach include analysis of (1) the emergence of purpose within the person’s overall life development; (2) the unique experiences, attitudes and access to resources that put the individual in the position to achieve the particular accomplishment; (3) the organization of work that the person uses – how various projects form a network of enterprise, in which projects can inspire and inform one another; (4) the intellectual commitments and habits of thought that the creative person uses, and (5) the working individual’s phenomenological experience.

The paradigm for this approach was Gruber’s (1974/1981) Darwin on Man, which was groundbreaking for the philosophy of science and Darwin scholarship as well as creativity research. This presentation will use examples from Gruber’s analysis of Darwin to illustrate the principles of evolving systems.

Since Gruber, Hanchett Hanson has applied evolving systems with two key revisions. First, this highly individualistic model is now used to examine the range of possible relationships between individuals and social systems (Csikszentmihally, 1999; Sawyer, 2006, 2010). Second, triangulation to other creativity research is now a core function of the detailed, scholarly evolving systems cases – contextualizing, qualifying and elaborating findings from other methodologies. Here again, Gruber’s analysis of Darwin illustrates how these modifications logically extend the original approach.

Both of these modifications point to a greater appreciation of the social context in which people develop and work. Here, Life Positioning Analysis may be instructive, with the evolving systems’ emphasis on purpose and LPA’s emphasis on roles serving as a bridge. This argument will be framed but left for discussion after the presentation of a complete evolving systems case.

Not “Just” a Comedian: A Case Study of Jon Stewart
April Nickell, Columbia University

In 1995, MTV cancels the Jon Stewart Show putting its young, leather jacket-clad host out of a television hosting job for the third time. In fact, Jon Stewart’s first ten years on the comedy scene were met with dead ends in acting, hosting, and very limited success in stand-up. When he took over the anchor chair of Comedy Central’s The Daily Show (TDS), however, Stewart gained success. By 2008, according to an online poll by Time, Jon Stewart is among

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“the most trusted (news)men in America” (Kakutani, 2008). In his role on TDS, Stewart has had tangible influence beyond his show. For example, in December 2010, Stewart was compared to Edward R. Murrow when he dedicated an entire episode to the 9/11 first responders bill which was being derailed in the Senate by a filibuster (Hernandez, 2010). Just days after this episode, the bill was unanimously passed (Carter & Stelter, 2010).

Theories tend to place creativity predominantly in either the person or the culture. In the case of Jon Stewart, there are strong arguments for both. Using the Aristotelian concept of ethos, this case argues that Stewart’s persona may best be understood as an evolving system (Gruber, 1989), and the ethos of that persona has the power to persuade the field (audience/gatekeepers) to accept his creative product. This fit between individual development and sociocultural context is possible due to current technology and media domains (Csikszentmihalyi, 1999).

To illustrate the distinctive power of that fit, the TDS approach to key issues will be compared to another satiric news show, Real Time with Bill Maher. As Aristotle explained, people are more willing to believe “good men.” From that perspective, Stewart’s success and influence, compared to that of Bill Maher, can be attributed to the differences in the ethos of their persona’s. Stewart’s now powerful persona, ironically developed from his complicated prior experiences and cultural influences, many of which would usually be considered failures.

Thursday, March 6, 3:00 p.m.

**Obsession, Technology, and the Modern Subject**

*John L. Roberts, University of West Georgia*

As Taylor (1989) argues, modern subjectivity – as manifested in Cartesian inquiry into new foundations for knowledge – is early characterized by a radical reflexivity in which the contents of mental life may be apprehended in the full light of consciousness. The task of detecting alarming and threatening thoughts, passions, and impulses would require doubtful vigilance, and allow the subject its project of fashioning a “punctual self” without the need for the external restraints of despotic power. Following Foucault (1975), the first part of my prospective presentation traces the co-emergence of obsession as a category of psychologized suffering with modern disciplinary power, which internalizes within the subject the policing of thought and action, installing certitude as a standard of perfectability. As suggested by Lenard (2008), “the internal psychological mechanism by which the process of self-regulation occurred . . . might look a lot like the obsessive-compulsive motor” (p. 15). Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, obsession – through monomania and later obsessional neurosis – is increasingly submitted to the normalizing technologies of psychiatric practice, the pace and efficiency of the industrial world often at odds with the deliberation required for the “quality control” of one’s inner life.

The second part of the paper augments the foregoing discussion through an examination of the structure of obsessional subjectivity vis-à-vis Lacanian theory. For Lacan, the structure of obsessional neurosis is fundamentally Cartesian in its strategy to conflate Being with thinking, and to posit an integral subject who does not need others, socially and interpersonally, to come to truth, which coincides with knowledge (Fink, 1999). The upshot of this arrangement is that the subject’s desire circulating around the “certain” knowledge it may attain for itself, and its refusal to accept the unknowing occasioning real relationships with others, results in a paradoxically complete submission to the symbolic Other, and its technologies for control and standardization of knowledge. Not accidentally, the structure of obsession bears similarity to what Lacan calls “university discourse,” which tends to totalize phenomena in what might be expressed in positive statements. The obsessional subject, thus, becomes a devalued counterpart to the ideal subject of Enlightenment rationality, now refashioned as a node for the distribution of bio-power (Foucault, 1980). Finally, I sketch a
possible future for obsession in the light the rise of the “new symptom” identified by Lacanians with a kind of bypass of the symbolic order – i.e., contemporary experiences of anorexia, bulimia, cutting, addiction, etc. (Loose, 2011).

**Transformational-transformative ontology: Self-choreographed dancing of the psychological kinds**

Aydan Gülerce, Boğaziçi University

Psychology did not only grow in isolation from philosophy and common sense, but also lacked considerable social relevance, responsibility and ecological validity. It does not have an adequate ontology, but a uniformative methodology, and hegemonically positivist and empiricist epistemology. It cannot yet think for itself. In effect, at the wake of late/post-modernity, numerous critiques which scrutinized Western rationalism, its modernist scientism and grand narratives also made inroads into some avant-garde corners of Psychology. Notwithstanding these weak reflections on its presumably universal and unified subject that is acontextual, ahistorical, asocial, acultural, autonomous, self-contained and so on, the majority of psychologists un/wittingly insist on, or simply cannot exit apart from, the discourse of the ‘psy-complex’, and hence they sustain the staus quo. This is one of the observations which serve as the point of departure for this presentation towards an inclusive psychological intelligibility-sensibility. Second, whether it is deterministically and intrinsically linked with the rationalities of political power in the sense of ‘governmentality’, or not, Psychology, perhaps having accomplished its modernist mission in the early industrialized societies’ transition to liberal democracy, has been globally disseminating its goods and contaminating other societies ‘out there’ which experience different ‘time-zones’ with ‘alternative forms of modernization’, spiritual/cultural views of humanness, and historical/narrative knowledge of humanity. Third, even if the ‘psy-complex’ might have come to constitute the subject ‘in here’ as a proper citizen for a particular social order, it seems to have been ‘making up’ people (as in Hacking’s ‘historical ontology’), who either are ‘medicated’, or ‘mediated’ by its mono-logic (discourse). Fourth, just as the disciplinary subject is partial and divided, so is what most of its critiques presuppose or construct. Unable to attend to the different sorts of critiques and sources of problematics all at once, they usually are un/knowingly perpetuating various other issues of inadequacy that they neglect, even if they somehow transgress the gap they mind. At the end of the day, one is left only with various insights for the historical conditions of the subject’s possibility (as in Foucauldian critique), or how to remap and locate the subject in the discourse (as in Derridan poststructuralist deconstruction). Critical psychologists, on the other hand, desire morally responsible agency for resistance in rhetoric, and yet cannot find it.

I am interested in resistance, but also in creativity as dynamic and indeterministic change. Therefore, in the paper I necessarily invite a re(con)figured and transformed psychoanalysis into the critical psychological conversations as a metapsychological, hermeneutical as well as ontogenetic source towards a radical subversion. I first quickly attend to the four major ontological models and dualities that underlied and preoccupied Western thought in general, and hence Psychology in particular. Second, I do the same for some contemporary efforts, which are trying to overcome a particular split/debate of their interest. Third, I briefly deliberate and evaluate their contributions in terms of ‘relevant’ and incommensurable, but potentially complementary ‘psychological kinds’ in the making of transformational-transformative ontology that I propose. I define three major prototypical subrealms of the indivisible, nonunified but integrally pluralistic human lifeworlds. I also offer various paradigmatic features of these intellectual ‘families of resemblance’ not necessarily for a comparison, but as horizontal and dialogic possibilities for what I call, transformative triangulation towards ‘futuristic’ and ‘liberatory’ psychological projects of intersubjectivity.
Atoms, qualia, and the current status of physicalism
Martin E. Morf, University of Windsor (Canada)

Three specific objectives pertaining to the “hard problem” of the brain-qualia relationship are pursued.

(1) The somewhat different tensions between naturalists and supernaturalists within physics and psychology are examined. Physicists appear to fall into two camps. Stephen Hawking asserts that “there is one world and it is physical,” and Lawrence Krauss concurs. However, many of their fellow physicists see intelligent design in the unique constellation of physical constants that make life and human consciousness possible. Psychologists can be divided into four groups: the radical and moderate naturalists and the moderate and radical supernaturalists.

(2) Each of the four kinds of psychologists is briefly characterized. Radical naturalists or reductionist physicists see humans as “nothing but” biological organisms, their emergents are reducible to cells and atoms, and their interpretations are based on the facts and the theory of evolution. Moderate naturalists differ from their radical colleagues only in that their emergents, like the quale associated with the experience of the redness of a rose, can in practice never be reduced to neural processes, let alone to the dance of small particles. Both moderate and radical supernaturalists endorse substance dualism, rely on the self as originating agent, and their emergents are irreducible in principle. The radical supernaturalists, in addition, postulate external agents and they may categorically reject Darwinian evolution.

(3) Recent steps taken by philosophers to deal with the relationship between qualia and physical processes are reviewed. First, philosophers have shifted the focus from mental and physical substances to mental and physical properties of physical substances, e.g., from “mind” to the qualia characterizing experiences of pain, agency, or beauty. Second, they unequivocally describe mental properties of states, systems, and events as realized in, or supervenient on, states of the brain. Third, they think of things which have mental properties as token-identical with many different states of the brain—varying from occasion to occasion, from person to person—rather than type identical with one single physical state. These steps may be baby steps, but they suggest Hawking went too far when he announced that “philosophy is dead,” and they strengthen—as one might expect—moderate as opposed to radical stances.

What does the body know? Towards a redefinition of interoceptive awareness
Jonathan Gibson, University of West Georgia

The understanding of bodily or interoceptive awareness (IA) has historically been rather nebulous. Some definitions of IA have been defined as sensitivity to stimuli originating inside the body (see Cameron, 2001). Contemporary research supports an expanded definition that includes a collection of bodily processes that are transmitted to the brain, giving rise to awareness of the internal milieu (Herbert, B.M., Pollatos, O, 2011). There is a wealth of literature substantiating the fact that the body does indeed influence the brain (Damasio, 1994; Porges, 2011; Siegel, 2012), and there are studies that suggest possible relationships between the degree of IA and cognition and emotion (Dunn et al., 2006) decision making (Dunn, B. et. al, 2012) empathy (Fukushima, H. et al, 2010) reappraisal (Fustos, J. et al, 2012) emotion and behavior regulation (Herbert, B. M, et al, 2007) and so on. However, virtually all of the research, and, subsequently, our understanding of this capacity seems to be constrained due to the reliance on the experimental method, particularly the Heart Beat Detection method. I will argue that these methodological limitations as well as certain philosophical assumptions (i.e. mind-body dualism) have led to the varied definitions and misunderstandings over the past century. Indeed, upon closer inspection there appears to be at least two different capacities related to IA that has been clumped together into a single
construct. These capacities have different functions and utilities, one of which has important implications related to an increased sense of well-being and expanded awareness. In this presentation, I will identify what those two different capacities are and propose a delineation and reconceptualization of those which have methodological and practical implications.

Thursday, March 6, 4 p.m.

HaraQueen: Donna Haraway, Alexander McQueen, and critical psychology
Jacob W. Glazier, University of West Georgia

The professional projects of Donna Haraway, a third-wave feminist, and Alexander McQueen, an avant-garde fashion designer, show remarkable convergence in their appropriative, purposeful blurring of the distinction between the natural and technological thereby disclosing what constitutes truth for both figures; namely, to be duped. The title of this presentation, HaraQueen, is a portmanteau of their last names that points precisely to this fact. HaraQueen is also a type of homophone - horror queen - that holds in concert the contradistinctive semantics of these two words: horror meaning an affection of disgust, revulsion, and dread, and queen meaning the status of divine right, potentate, and sovereign; not under the sign of the same, but in all their distinctive g(l)ory such that difference is honored. The aesthetic of McQueen exemplifies the ability, through his fashions, to recode the body in such a way as to upend what might be considered natural or beautiful. This commentary on the herd mentality of beauty - the patriarchal objectification of the female body as sex object - exposes the body as up for grabs, as a site of disputation. Coupled with his love of nature, this makes for an ironic paradox that punctures the dialectic, natural-technical, rendering it leaky and, yet, preserves the two dichotomies as indissoluble.

Concomitantly, Haraway is committed to an analogous trickster methodology. As a trained biologist, her professional scholarship is infused with articulating a primordial being-with-others (e.g., technology, animals, humans, etc.) that comes from studying the radical anti-anthropomorphism of biological discourse. Most famously, she initiated cyborg studies as a way to envision a non-instrumentalist relationship with technologies as well as to inhibit said technologies critically. The site at which the confluence between Haraway and McQueen reaches its climax is in McQueen’s spring / summer 2001 show V OSS. This particular fashion show captures the sine qua non of both of their methodologies: the duping of the hegemonic other. What is so clever about V OSS is that the elephant in the room had been there the whole time but nobody knew there was an elephant - the elephant only came into being once the duping had occurred. Such a reveal generates an affective aesthetic by walking the razor’s edge of camp and couture, being at once monstrous and enchanting; slip and the position either falls into either extreme otherness or reifies current norms. The audience members at V OSS were left with a feeling of being unnerved and unsettled, of not-being-at-home. The interface between Haraway and McQueen has implications for various strands of critical psychology. Although critical studies in psychology have tended to ally with social constructionism and reject any kind of foundational realism, the interface between Haraway and McQueen builds a bridge over the abyss between these two antinomies. This reading of V OSS demonstrates that trickster strategies can flank the iron curtain of metonymy and breach it through artifice: claims can be made about the world even if given indirectly through wit, humor, or irony.

Somatic narrative: Impact: An exploration of the physical impact of words
C. Catherine Mellor, Ben Arcangeli, Rachel Carbonara, Adeline Dettor, David Goodman, & Danielle Moreno, Lesley University

Individuals are shaped by a myriad of factors, such as one’s culture, past experiences, and relationships with others (Valle, King, & Halling, 1989). Labeling is a purposeful means of description and has become an embedded part of our everyday experience (Todd & Bohart,
Specific words or labels can trigger negative emotions, shift one’s perspective (e.g. perpetuating negative stereotypes), or bring back the experience of a past trauma. There is a power in these words, or “labels,” and the experiences we come to associate with them. Thus, the words used to describe various experiences can shape our notion of self, others, and the world around us (Alter, 2010). The authors detail the nature of an ongoing research and intervention project entitled “Impact: An Exploration of the Physical Impact of Words,” which explores the somatic relationship of negative “labels” (i.e. the linguistics of trauma) and how this affects one’s personal narrative. Volunteer participants were asked to select a single word or “label” that has negatively impacted their personal narrative and explore its physical impact on their own body. Using make-up and face paint, participants created a “bruise” on the desired area of their body, representative of their experience and its impact on their narrative. This artistic process is captured through photography, film, and audio recordings, which will be compiled into a documentary.

Sharing one’s personal narrative (i.e. storytelling) can provide a powerful shift in how we relate to a negative experience or trauma (Gilsdorf, 2013). This artistic intervention illustrates how specific words or labels associated with a traumatic or painful experience can be internalized and used to compose one’s personal narrative. Impact aims to facilitate mind-body awareness and empower individuals through artistic expression. Further implications of this work aim to address the ongoing social issues of mind-body awareness, labeling, body image, bullying, and the transformative impact of this artistic intervention.

**Ancient wisdom and modern neuroscience: Aurobindo, Damasio, and the multi-layered self**

*B.T. Carton & B.W. Becker, Lesley University*

Many spiritual and religious traditions have outlined ways of life that cultivate happiness, health, compassion, capability, and many other traits characterizing states of well-being. The Yogic traditions that have arisen throughout human history offer detailed, systematic, practicality-based methods for creating and sustaining such a lifestyle. These traditions acknowledge the human as a multi-faceted being, and believe spiritual development to be inseparable from physical, mental, emotional, moral, and interpersonal development. For this reason, Yogic practices are designed to help humans grow on all possible fronts. Regardless of practitioners’ spiritual or religious beliefs, the numerous forms of Yoga have proven themselves valuable to individuals and cultures looking to further their functional capabilities, their enjoyment of life, their ability to navigate adversity, and their understanding of themselves.

In this paper, Yogic models of consciousness are juxtaposed with the theories of consciousness developed by Antonio Damasio (1999) in his book *The Feeling of What Happens*. Damasio’s conception of consciousness bears a resemblance to the Yogic conception as both propose consciousness to be a multi-layered, or multi-leveled, phenomenon. In particular, the widely-renowned Yogi Sri Aurobindo described a model of the levels of consciousness similar to Damasio. Sri Aurobindo’s model is emphasized to demonstrate the particular parallels it shares with Damasio’s. Both portray consciousness as being the construction of multiple levels of physical, emotional, and mental/cognitive phenomenon.

A number of religious and spiritual traditions offer psychological insight which holds both theoretical and practical value. Studying traditions such as Yoga and translating their principles into metaphorical narrative offers a fruitful resource of contemporary psychology. I propose that this multi-layered model of consciousness calls for integrative therapies that address all identifiable levels of consciousness. If consciousness is composed of distinct but interacting levels then patterns of behavior, thought, emotion, and sensation will be most profoundly and sustainably changed if the therapeutic approach being applied is working with every level possible.
Ethics and embodiment: Re-evaluating the role of the body in ethical development
John C. Christopher, Dartmouth Medical School

In most ethical traditions the body is viewed as impediment to ethical development and conduct. The body has been linked to sin, the passions, or our animalistic heritage and traditions as diverse as Christianity, Platonism, and Yoga, warn us to be wary of the body and even to promote austerities or mortifications to keep the body from interfering with spiritual and ethical development. Ethics is treated as rules or commandments that one learns, memorizes, and then applies, hence the importance of cultivating reason and cognition. Much of ethics treats the moral domain narrowly as exclusively other-regarding—and ethics functions to offset our inherent psychological egoism. I explore how dominant views of ethics obscure the way that our bodies can actually be the source of ethical sensitivity and provide us with a kind of moral compass. I begin by integrating a) a number of theorists from a variety of academic fields including Taylor, Gendlin, Winnicott, Damasio, and Siegel, b) insights from contemplative and meditative traditions, and c) first person data generated from over 30 years of my own personal meditation and yoga practice and 15 years of teaching mindfulness to counseling students to make the following points:

1) our view of the moral domain has been overly narrow and that every moment of life is morally laden.
2) the long standing tendency in the Western tradition to treat the body, emotions, and reason as separate faculties distorts the human experience and alienates us from our body
3) the body provides moral or ethical feedback about our relationship with others, ourselves, and nature.
4) the feedback from our body becomes disrupted by trauma and stress
5) there are methods for cultivating the ability to remain connected to the body and be more perceptive of the feedback it is always providing us.

Friday, March 7, 10:00 a.m.

Self-determination theory: A critical Analysis
Wanda Power; Jack Martin, Discussant, Simon Fraser University

This paper is a critical, theoretical, and empirical analysis of Edward Deci and Richard Ryan’s Self-Determination Theory (SDT), in which I examine the concepts, philosophical assumptions, logic, and methods upon which the theory is based. SDT is a theory of motivation that is primarily concerned with the location of motivation: whether it originates within the self or is sourced from outside the self. This extrinsic-intrinsic distinction, central to the theory, is questioned and found to be untenable. Further, the theory lacks a clear mechanism that might explain how the external becomes internal. An investigation of concepts central to SDT—motivation, autonomy, self, and self-determination—shows them to be inconsistent and sometimes incoherent, an observation that casts doubts on claims the theory makes. While the theory appears to be about human beings as active agents, it is questioned whether the self-determination outlined within this theory is in keeping with any meaningful idea of human agency. Further, analysis of the assumptions made and methods used within the SDT framework shows that the theory is firmly rooted in an atomistic, individualistic worldview that is particular to Western culture, and this undermines theoretical claims of universality. An investigation of the aims of SDT shows a bias towards individualism on the one hand and, in seeming contradiction to this, a program of social control on the other. Finally, though the theory takes the individual self as primary, it is questionable whether the theory can truly be said to apply to any individual person. To illustrate some of these problems, the paper considers in detail one piece of research used by Deci and Ryan (2012) to support SDT, questioning whether the claims made by SDT can be grounded in such research.
Ethical epistemic methodology in the social sciences
Chase O’Gwin & Ron Hopkins, University of West Georgia

In psychology, the subject of inquiry should necessitate a methodological approach which explicitly acknowledges individual differences in beliefs and identity. The individual differences in ontological and epistemological beliefs shape how a particular phenomenon is experienced by human beings. Identity is a multi-faceted construct involving individual beliefs as well as participation within a specific sociocultural context. Therefore, the theoretical framework for the methodology of psychology as well as the social sciences must incorporate an acknowledgement of the complicated nature of human identity. The presupposition of any assumed universal reductionist ontological framework projects onto the subject rather than valuing individual’s reported accounts. Ethical issues arise from universal reductionist ontological frameworks as they either negate or ignore the actual subjective experience as would be reported by the subject. Consequently, the resulting report may not accurately represent the actual subjective experience of the people. As a result, alienation occurs in the subject as their experience is cast as anomalous and/or abnormal.

It is proposed that research should incorporate an ethnographic element that allows for the subject(s) to report their experiences as they were actually experienced. In so doing, the subject(s) will be empowered to more fully and accurately express themselves. As a result, the final report provided within the research will encompass a more holistic representation of what actually occurred. Following a short presentation outlining this proposal, discussion will follow as to the merits and challenges of the practical application.

Using systematic review methods for topics in philosophical and theoretical psychology
Paul Fehrmann & Edith Sicken, Kent State University

In all academic disciplines it is common to see authors refer to what is found in 'the literature'; and in many areas the traditional literature review (TLR) is used to provide a summary look at what has been 'done before'. TLR methods are widely used to summarize or synthesize literature on a topic, etc. Projects that benefit from TLR include university student papers, theses, and dissertations, as well as professional articles and grant proposals.

However, among other concerns, critics have pointed to the potential for biased representation of topics when TLR are used. Some have pointed to concerns with potential unconscious or conscious “cherry picking” of publications to support a reviewers viewpoint, or reviewers using an unrepresentative subset of literature, or to the lack of details about the steps taken or key decisions made as TLR are developed. In response, a large systematic review methods (SR) literature in the health and social sciences offers itself as evidence that the shortcomings of TLR might be significantly reduced. The Cochrane Collaboration and Campbell Collaboration are two organizations with guidance for pursuing and executing SR, and the following depicts a common understanding of SR. “A systematic review aims to comprehensively locate and synthesize research that bears on a particular question, using organized, transparent, and replicable procedures at each step in the process...a systematic review follows a protocol (a detailed plan) that specifies its central objectives, concepts, and methods in advance. Steps and decisions are carefully documented so that readers can follow and evaluate reviewer’s methods.” (Littell, J. H. et al., 2008, p.1). Systematic reviews and meta-analysis / Julia H. Littell, Jacqueline Corcoran, Vijayan Pillai. Oxford University Press.

Furthermore, SR methods themselves are evolving, and adaptations are found in a range of disciplines. Moreover, ‘rapid reviews’ and ‘scoping reviews’ have been adopted as methods for those needing to complete initial pictures of what literatures are showing on topics. These are two sample papers on “rapid reviews” as a method: (1) Expediting systematic reviews: methods and implications of rapid
reviews: www.implementationscience.com/content/5/1/56; (2) Evidence summaries: the evolution of a rapid review approach: www.systematicreviewsjournal.com/content/1/1/10

The proposed presentation will provide the results of a ‘rapid review’ used to develop a picture of the use of SR methods for topics in theoretical and philosophical psychology (TPP). In combination with results from that review, observations concerning ‘non-substantive methods’, which are currently widely used in psychology, including TPP, will be used to argue that increased use of SRM might have value for TPP topics. Additional recommendations will also be offered.

Friday, March 7, 11:00 a.m.

**SYMPOSIUM: Selling a bill of “goods”: Science, marketing, and human identity**

*David M. Goodman, Lesley University/Harvard Medical School; Sam Gable, Katie Howe, & David House, Lesley University*

How is identity sold to us as a bill of “goods” in a quasi-secular, scientific society such as the United States? What role does science play in becoming the marketing tool of the “goods” toward which we live? How is desire taught and subjectivity shaped with reference to these “goods” (Zizek, 2006)? In this presentation, the authors explore the complex interpellation of science, values, ideology, and individual identity. In particular, we consider how the process of scientific study and dissemination transmits ideology in such a way that produces a type of subject with a particular form of language for its identity and experience. We question how values become cloaked in science and repackaged for consumption in a capitalist context. We argue, alongside of many others, that our subjectivities are not mere representational systems, but also extensions of socio-economic, political, and historical values (Cushman, 1995; Kirschner & Martin, 2010, Layton, 2009). And, we track some of the specifics of this extending process. Toward this end and for the purpose of illustration, we explore some of the language in evidence-based practice research and the manner with which “effectiveness” is defined and implemented in these scientific studies and literatures (e.g., symptom-reduction, increased sense of well-being, improvement in functioning). A great deal is implicated in the question of what treatments are “effective.” We examine how what “works” or is “effective” often links to the specific moral vision and self-configuration (Christopher, 1996; Cushman, 1995) of a neo-liberal subject whose self-enclosure and fortified sense of agency is assumed (Binkley, 2011). In conclusion, the authors problematize any “clean” notions of “effectiveness” and consider how science and marketing become married and blurred in contemporary research dissemination/practice. The implications of this are explored, with particular interest in how existing social positioning (e.g., social class) is reinforced and cloaked in the present dimensions of scientific marketing. The design of this presentation would involve a relatively short presentation of the argument, followed by facilitated discussion with the audience.

**Clinical Zizek: The emancipatory act in the treatment hour**

*Dan Rose, Columbus State University*

The philosopher Slavoj Zizek is often referred to as “the Elvis of philosophy” or, often a bit more respectfully, as “the philosopher of the real.” Both descriptors capture important components of the man and his corpus. The backbone of Slavoj Zizek’s philosophy is rooted in his often idiosyncratic reworking of the ideas of the psychoanalyst Jacque Lacan, hence the title “philosopher of the real.” Zizek has removed Lacan from the consulting room, combined Lacan with Karl Marx and Friedrich Hegel (among other German Idealists) and then turned this chimera on the world of politics and culture (with Zizek’s near maniacal public exposition of his philosophical themes earning him the Elvis comparison). This paper will reverse Zizek’s trajectory and return Zizek to the clinical hour that is the too often hidden root of his philosophical project. The emphasis of the paper will be to show that in both Zizek’s
combination of disparate philosophies and in their application to a subject outside of the psychoanalytic couple, some important transformations have occurred. These transformations, particularly as they relate to trauma or namely the trauma implicit at the birth of subject and the traumas necessary for that same subjectivity’s growth, have clinical utility. By focusing on Zizek’s concepts of the Act, his unique take on subjectivity and his reformulation of the Real as an ontological and developmental necessity a systematic sketch of Zizek’s philosophy will be provided and its potential relevance to psychotherapy and the very notion of subjectivity outlined. A case example will be used to demonstrate Zizek’s utility.

**Historical critiques and current re-emergencies of symbolic interactionism**

*Richard E. La Fleur & Christina L. Wright, University of West Georgia*

From its initial beginnings in the 1930’s with roots “planted by Cooley, Dewey, Thomas and Mead” (Stryker, 1987, p. 83), symbolic interactionism (SI) has experienced multiple trajectories, moving from a place of popularity and prominence to a demise due in part to multiple critiques and now to a possible resurgence today. Stryker (1987) and Fine (1993) articulated the demise of SI and offered possible options for its resurgence. Despite its initial demise, in the two decades since these writings, SI continued to be utilized, particularly in social psychology. Understanding the demise of SI in the 1960’s and 1970’s is vital to understanding its re-emergence and the place it holds today in psychology and sociology. The first aim of this paper is to examine four component of SI that led to its demise:

1. Internal criticisms
2. External criticisms
3. Ethnomethodological criticisms
4. Political and economic ideologies criticisms

After understanding the components of the demise of SI, this paper will then discuss how the emerging utilizations of SI attempt to address those components in an attempt at revitalizing this perspective. By understanding the historical debates surrounding SI, contextualizing its demise gives value to it reemergence and a deeper understanding of the relationship between society and people. More specifically, the utilization of SI in research on the reintegration process of veterans post war zone deployment and the difficulties they face in the civilian world addresses various critiques concerning the rigor of SI as well as how psychology addresses reflexivity in social constructs (Stryker 1987). Similarly, research on how religious leaders understand issues around sexual orientation demonstrates how SI addresses the critique of its inability to fully account for social structures (Gouldner, 1970) and its apparent appeal to the status quo (Huber, 1973). This presentation will include interactive discussions on both components of the paper.

**Friday, March 7, 1:30 p.m.**

**SYMPOSIUM: Explicating the psychological, embodied, and institutional machinery of industrial higher education**

Scholarly, humanistic, and critical approaches to higher education have become increasingly oppressed and suppressed by an ever-more industrialized academia; so much so, that there seems little room for complacency about how psychology is both implicit in, and afflicted by, this transformation. The presentations in this symposium represent reflections, grounded both in the prophetic theories of the past and in the insistent exigencies of the present, on the machinery of this industrialization. The first set of presenters draw on the theories of Giroux, Berry, and Heidegger to explicate the institutional forms of industrialized higher education. The authors pay specific attention to the academic monocultures growing from increasing standardization and assessment and briefly consider some more sustainable alternatives. Drawing on the ideas of Klaus Holzkampf, the second presenter examines
Industrialization in Higher Education

Joseph A. Ostenson, University of Tennessee at Martin; Joshua W. Clegg, John Jay College, CUNY; & Bradford J. Wiggins, Brigham Young University-Idaho

In the United States, higher education has traditionally been understood as a public good, funded primarily by the public and intended to encourage democratic and civic engagement among students (Kezar, 2004). Recent decades, however, have seen a notable shift in our approach to higher education, with a move away from democratic processes and toward corporate ones (Giroux, 2002). This shift is most evident in the dramatic decrease in public education funding and an accompanying increase in student costs, but this is only the most obvious way in which higher education has become commercialized (e.g., Giroux, 1999; Thrupp & Willmott, 2003). In general, higher education has become managerial and corporate in its governing structures and neoliberal in its politics. The purpose of this paper is to discuss elements of a model that illuminates and gives context to these changes by explicating them within the theoretical framework of industrialization. Drawing on the work of Heidegger, Berry, Giroux, and others, we try to make sense of specific industrializing phenomena – namely, the shift from tenure and shared governance to specialized, corporate administration; the dislocation of academic communities from specific places to dispersed, non-local collectives; the institutionalization of growth and productivity; and the movement toward an academic monoculture. Our comments in this presentation will focus particularly on the growing academic monoculture, with its emphasis on standardization and assessment, and we will show how this approach to education is unsustainable, both in an ecological sense as well as in an academic one. We will conclude our presentation with a brief discussion of more sustainable alternatives, alternatives based on restrained growth, localized curriculum and governance, and other non-industrial values.

“Variable Psychology” and Assessment: A Critical Analysis of Presupposed “Standards” in Education Practice

Chris Head, Graduate Center, City University of New York

This paper utilizes Klaus Holzkamp’s (1992) notion of “variable psychology” as a way to examine current practices in increasingly bureaucratized educational systems. In accordance with Holzkamp’s critique of psychology’s empirical methodology, this article addresses prominent investigative practices that reduce complex social phenomena into presupposed socially constructed concepts, which are then “proven” as valid and reliable features of human existence. By fragmenting social processes into isolated variables, relegating subjectivity to the category of intervening variables that can be controlled for and explained away, this “variable scheme” is exclusionary in a manner that both mitigates contextuality and perpetuates alienation. For Holzkamp, these procedures served as mechanisms that justify and reify existing social “realities,” thus justifying and reifying the existing social order. This framework provides a basis to examine the rational, evidence based evaluative schemes fashionable in modern education. To the extent that educational systems operate in accordance with their end goals, these “benchmarks” drive the systems as a whole. These end goals, then, are understood as variables. But what are the end goals and what are the actual end goals of organizing education organizations around these ends goals? With
Holzkamp’s critique in mind, this paper aims to examine these privileged variables: both their presuppositions and the implications of their role in educational practice. In accepting these concepts as the end goals for education, policy makers often (a) overlook the assumptions imbedded in these concepts, (b) fail to consider what is being lost by placing these variables as the ones worthy of being considered, (c) reduce the concept to only that which can be easily measured, and (d) participate in a process that serves some interests at the expense of others. Specifically, the variable-ized concept of “standards” is called into question and treated as an exemplar that elucidates critical flaws in the bureaucratic ethos. By examining variable-ization in the context of rationalized educational institutions, this paper aims to explore the significance and implications of placing at the heart of our educative and socializing institutions, abstractions that frequently go unexamined.

The mechanization of experience: industrialism’s effect on affect, imagination, and psychological knowledge

Fernando Quigua, The Graduate Center, City University of New York

This presentation considers the impact of industrialization on affect, experience, and imagination. Drawing first on James’s somatic theory of emotion (1884), his descriptions of consciousness (1890), and Dewey’s (1934) theory of aesthetics, I argue that the shift from craft production to mass production during the industrial revolution produced a concomitant shift in sensibility. Artisanal work required somatic and imaginative engagement with materials, and as Dewey claims, it fostered an aesthetic sensitivity. With the onset of industrialism, however, the habits imposed by mechanized labor blunted aesthetic sensitivity on a wide scale, producing a numbing effect on experience that persists through our cultural forms. Hillman (2006) catalogues how contemporary anesthesia undermines both democracy and mental health, an outcome, he claims, that benefits political and economic elites. Hillman also notes how clinical psychology colludes in this state of affairs; its theories subvert patients’ outrage at corporate, political, and aesthetic abuses, attributing psychic suffering instead to patients’ personal histories and “chemical imbalances.” More broadly, Billig (1994; 2011) has critiqued the methodological and rhetorical practices of psychology that, in the name of “objectivity” and “precision,” conceal persons, local contexts, relations of power, and experience. I conclude the presentation by commenting on psychology’s contribution to our condition of anesthesia and dislocated experience, arguing that much of the discipline provides us less a reflection of our humanity than it enshrines the construct that industrial and neoliberal pressures would have us assume. For this reason, I argue for the integration of the arts and humanities into our psychological and educational practices, both for the restoration of imagination and sense to our discipline.

Dialectic of character

Victor Clark (aka Peter), Independent Scholar

Character is an important topic for philosophical psychologists who want to understand the causal relationship between temperament, drives and values (Piekkola, 2011). Klages (1932) and Stern (1938) developed grand theories of personality in which each defined character as a real dialectic between the subjective and objective aspects of the whole person. This view of character as a deep, broad and historically extensive individual identity was in sharp contrast to the nomothetic concept of personality as individual differences of a one-dimensional surface appearance observed between strangers.

The nomothetic approach that compares characteristics between people in a ranking order of surface traits (Lamiell, 2003) creates a one-dimensional mannequin which makes character as a hierarchy of temperament, drives and values indistinguishable from personality. In this presentation, Mr. Clark will briefly compare theories of character by Klages and Stern followed by remarks from Dr. James Lamiell on Stern with plenty of time for
discussion. We look forward to lively dialogue on this controversial topic between audience members striving to express their surface differences from their unique perspectives of character.

Klages' and Stern's grand theories of personality based respectively on Klages' biocentric (Pryce, 2001: http://www.revilo-oliver.com/Writers/Klages/Ludwig_Klages.html) and Stern's (1938) personalistic philosophies, in contrast to nomothetic personality test theory, explained the surface appearance of an individual personality from the perspective of character as a dynamic structural hierarchy. Today Klages is forgotten except as a minor footnote for originating the lexical approach of the Five Factor Model in personality (John, Naumann & Soto, 2008, p.117). Except for Dr. Lamiell's efforts (Woodward, 2013), Stern is also today only a footnote for the discovery of the Intelligence Quotient (IQ) formula in differential psychology.

William Stern (1871-1938) is the father of differential psychology (Stern, 1900; cited by Lamiell, 2003), or intelligence and personality testing. And Ludwig Klages (1872-1956), who is the father of dynamic graphology (Lewinson, 1986), or modern handwriting analysis, criticized differential psychology for ignoring the subjective imagination of an individual (Klages, 1932, 274, Endnote #2). While on the other hand Stern (1926) cited Klages as a "decided representative of personalism" (Stern, 1926, p. 268 cited by Allport & Vernon, 1933, p.168).

Both Klages (1932) and Stern (1938) defined character as the total make-up of a person in terms of their acts of will (following Schopenhauer's conceptualization of will-collisions) related to integration and conflict between natural impulses and purposeful action. In distinction from Aristotle's definition, “character is the entelechy of the willing personality” (Stern,1938, p. 443). Following the moral philosophy of Kant, both Klages and Stern emphasized the conflict between duty and desire as it related to conscious self-control or inhibition in the development of an individual's character. Rather than focusing on the separate competition of opposite factors, though, Klages and Stern both emphasized the unifying dynamic of this existential struggle between impulse and self-control.

As a consequence of the struggle between conflicting desires, on the one hand, and the need for wholeness or integration on the other, configurations of a dynamic hierarchy emerge for each individual that precisely define their unique character in three-dimensions: (1) the vertical conscious vs. unconscious divisions; (2) the horizontal "social," or broad, domains of work, relationships, etc.; and (3) the “time” dimension related to phases of development in a person's life history.

Though not directly translatable into nomothetic methods of empirical validity in personality testing, the theoretical preciseness of these two philosophical psychologists delineated individual assessment methods for "morphological" diagnosis of an individual's character (Allport,1963). Both Klages and Stern criticized the analytical methods of personality testing as inadequate to evaluate biological and psychological structures of character. But while Klages (1932) saw absolutely no benefit from the “school psychologists” tests, Stern (1938) on the other hand believed—though limited—tests could be useful when there was a need to compare differences between people for selection decisions in personnel or classroom placement.

An epistemology and ontology of dialogue

James M. Nelson, Valparaiso University

As a central discipline charged with studying the human person, psychology stands at an intersection with many fields of study including biology, philosophy and theology. This suggests that one of the most important activities for psychology should be dialogue with professionals in other academic traditions. However, a systematic treatment of how such
dialogues could be conducted and what we can expect from them remains incomplete. This paper discusses the theoretical and philosophical issues raised by the problem of dialogue.

One way of approaching the topic of dialogue is to ask the question, what is the nature of knowledge that we hope to produce through dialogue? Presumably a conversation is unlikely to be fruitful unless the participants share an understanding of its epistemic goals. This question turns out to have many possible answers. Traditionally, knowledge produced through dialogue has been assumed to be propositional in nature, consisting of verifiable assertions about states of affairs. However, there are many reasons to believe that this will seldom if ever be a possible product of productive dialogue. Another and perhaps more promising answer to the question would be to suppose that dialogue produces an understanding of practices of inquiry or change. Other epistemic possibilities also exist, and are complicated by the issues raised in contemporary virtue epistemology. The dialogue between psychology and religion provides an excellent case study that illustrates these possibilities.

A deeper examination of dialogue suggests that agreement on epistemic issues is a necessary but not sufficient condition for its success. A more fundamental question that may be asked is, what is the nature of the object of study? In dialogues related to psychology, this refers in part to our understanding of the nature of the human person. Positions on this issue—at root, an ontological concern—often operate as unspoken assumptions that can distort a productive conversation. Our ontology of personhood creates a horizon for dialogue. From a positive perspective, this horizon creates a space within which a dialogue can flourish, even if the participants have significant ontological differences. More importantly, from a negative perspective, an awareness of horizon can make the participants set realistic goals for a dialogue. The experience of horizon in dialogue can also lead to an appreciation for the transcendent possibility of the human person, which exceeds the ability of any single point of view to capture it.

**Ideas for teaching theoretical and philosophical psychology in a small, rural southeast college**

*Samuel D. Downs, University of South Carolina Salkehatchie*

In recent meetings of Division 24, many of the division members, including the current and past president, have emphasized ways to encourage more people to become a part of the division in some form or another. One such way to encourage membership in the division is through teaching theoretical and philosophical psychology to undergraduate or graduate students. I, and several other members, became involved in the division because I attended a class.

In this presentation, I discuss how I incorporate three different epistemologically based teaching styles to help students at a small, rural southeast college understand theoretical psychology. In research by Jeff Reber and colleagues, the use of these three teaching styles together increased student learning. First, I use an explanation teaching style that focuses on facts and definitions, such as the definition of ontology. Second, I use a meaning-based teaching style that focuses on connecting the concepts of a class to broader sociocultural issues, such as connecting Descartes’ dualism to the movie *The Matrix*. Third, I use a relational teaching style in which I strive to build relationships with my students by, for example, sharing personal experiences of how my understanding of theoretical psychology has helped me in the workplace. In my Survey of Personality class, I use these three teaching styles together to help students understand the basics of Aristotle’s four causes, the epistemologies of rationalism, empiricism, and hermeneutics, abstractionist and relational ontologies, and dialectic logic. In class, we discuss several different perspectives on personality, such as Freud’s and Bandura’s, while identifying how each theorist relates to the four causes, epistemology, ontology, and dialectic logic. As evidence of the importance of
teaching these concepts to students, I learned the basics of these concepts in my classes, for which I am very grateful, and I wish to help my students understand and apply them.

For about half of the presentation time, I will briefly explain how I use these three teaching styles in my classroom. For the other half of the presentation, I will open up dialogue with the audience so that together we can discuss ways to help students better learn and apply the concepts of theoretical and philosophical psychology. As a new professor, I am extremely interested in sharing my knowledge with my students and would like to hear what other professors, particularly the more established professors in the division, do to help their students.

Ultimately, better equipping early career professors to teach theoretical psychology will help their students become interested in the division and will most likely help the professors stay interested in the division as well. Even if the students we teach do not join the division, learning about and applying theoretical and philosophical psychology will most likely help our students and the field of psychology because more and more people in the field will be able to critically think about the assumptions made in mainstream psychology and the implications of these assumptions.

Friday, March 7, 3:00 p.m.

The potential of philosophical discourse toward the assessment and management of suicide risk

Robyn R. Gaier, Viterbo University

While the social stigma surrounding mental illness is often cited as the reason why many people who need help fail to get the help they need, I explore another, more specific, explanation in this paper. One such explanation is the idea that a person in a crisis is unable to see beyond the particular crisis (or crises) that she is facing. 1 An insurmountable problem (or problems) becomes the focal point of a person’s life. Yet in order for a person to seek the help she needs, she must not only believe that help is available, but she must also believe that help is possible. 2 Hence, the objective of my paper is to suggest a conceptual space in which philosophical discourse in a public setting might increase the likelihood of helping those in need of help to consider as possible what seems to them as impossible.

One worry, however, about engaging in philosophical discourse with persons in a crisis is simply that such discourse would do ‘more harm than good’ because it would be attempting to address what it cannot. I have a great deal of sympathy with such a view. Yet, recognizing the limits of philosophical discourse should not lead us to the conclusion that it is useless any more than recognizing the limits of rationality should prompt us to abandon the use of reason. I believe that philosophical discourse has a potential to help some people in a crisis to see beyond the crisis that they are experiencing by seeing the crisis in a different way, or from another perspective, which philosophical discourse may help to facilitate.

Furthermore, there is some evidence within the domain of psychology, which suggests that a more fundamental relationship between psychology and philosophical discourse may be particularly helpful with respect to assessing and managing suicide risk. For example, the practice of Collaborative Assessment and Management of Suicidality (CAMS) 3 debunks a widespread perception of traditional psychotherapy. The counselor is no longer seen as a director of a patient’s treatment plan but, rather, as a guide alongside of a patient through his journey. The methodologies supported in CAMS promote a kind of partnership between the counselor and the patient – ultimately, yielding greater patient accountability since the patient has a legitimate voice in how his treatment proceeds. If CAMS is an effective way to assess and to manage suicide risk, however, then I believe that philosophical discourse also has a potential to help at the step prior to such therapy – namely in forming the initial belief that help is, indeed, possible. Some potential questions to help guide discussion include, but are not limited to the following:
Reimagining maternal care in human development from birth to death: Ground for ethical provision

Mary Beth Morrissey, Fordham University Global Healthcare Innovation Management Center; & Frederick J. Wertz, Fordham University

From Freud to Winnicott, and among many developmental and theoretical psychologists and theoreticians in other disciplines who have followed and advanced their work, the study of maternal care has been a central focus in understanding infant and early childhood development. Winnicott’s (1965) construct of the maternal “holding environment” has also been used in multiple contexts of human development, experience and relational care, such as psychoanalysis (Starr, 2008; Orange, 2011; Wertz, 1981), to describe the constituents of care provision that are essential to the maternal attitude and the maternal dimensions of existence. However, little has been written about the maternal process of “holding” in palliative and end-of-life care and the beneficial impact upon patient well-being. Drawing on data from phenomenological studies of suffering among seriously ill older adults in nursing home and hospital settings (Morrissey, 2011; Morrissey, Wertz, Comfort & Jennings, 2014), this paper will identify the loss of a maternal ground or foundations as an essential constituent of the structure of suffering experience in serious illness, and describe the relationship of suffering to maternal experience over the life course, and to human development from birth to death.

The essential constituents of a maternal ground in the structure of suffering experience were identified as maternal generosity and relational intimacy, unconditional loving care and touch, empathy, fidelity, a receptive and protective welcoming home that is palliative, well-being and generativity. Older adult study participants struggled to attain well-being as they lived through suffering in remembering and re-enacting maternal care experiences. These findings suggest that maternal care as “total environmental provision” (Winnicott, 1965) offers promise in relieving suffering, and creating a space for growth and development even in serious illness, in particular, a movement toward fulfilling agency and spiritual transformation. The process of development in infancy from total dependency to transitional object relations, and finally disentanglement from maternal care, will be traced as a parallel and generative psychological, emotional and social process that occurs over the life course and especially, in the progression from serious illness to end of life. The central role of maternal care at the end of life mirrors the sensitive role of the mother in relation to the infant and in providing affordances: the integrating function of the holding environment is a ground not only of total support and palliation for the dying person who is living through pain and suffering and calling for the other, but a ground of final and inexorable processes of life integration, personal and interpersonal reconciliation, and ultimately separation, disintegration, and disentanglement from the primal maternal relation that signal and prepare for the impingement of death.

Finally, the implications of these findings for improving care practices and designing care environments, and their impact upon bioethical inquiry will be discussed. The essentially ethical nature of maternal care and obligation to the other will also be discussed as they concern appropriate ethics education for all health and human service professionals involved in care provision.

PANEL: Spinoza and Qualitative Research

Christopher Biase, Timothy Beck and Emaline Freidman, University of West Georgia
In Spinoza’s *Ethics*, three different types of knowledge are outlined that correspond to different degrees of activity produced through thought. The psycho-physical parallelism employed by Spinoza connects the activity of the mind to the body in a manner unique from other conceptions circulated by many contemporary psychological theories, which primarily rely on some form of dualist ontological framework. Moreover, following Spinoza, we suggest that qualitative psychological research methods might produce results more faithful to the discourses they use as their data if researchers conceive causality as immanent production rather than utilizing forms of explanation transcendent to the life of which the discourse expresses.

The central place in Spinozist ontology given to the site of the body, not as a closed totality but open and compositional, requires a shift in understanding affect and affection in such a way that the body becomes employed as an instrument of research. The ever complicated dialectic between subject and object that plagues our notions of attribution, agency, and meaning-making, is now understood in a new framework of perpetual becoming. The data that is thus produced refers not to a reified state of relations but to a new composition of material bodies and possibilities. Dispersing agency to the processes that happen in between material bodies rather than within particular bodies, has radical ramifications for understanding representation and political-social processes that can re-awaken a sense of a collectivity.

By pursuing a dialogue between the immanentist ontology detailed in Spinoza’s work and a few of the contemporary turns in qualitative methods and the corresponding difficulties they present to psychologists, the former may lend new concepts, directives, and criteria as to foster sharper insight into local epistemologies. Further, Spinoza’s philosophy will be presented as offering extended conceptions of causality and mind/body/world interconnectedness that may come to bear specifically on the sanction that qualitative research speak meaningfully to an increasingly global network.

**Friday, March 7, 4:00 p.m.**

**SYMPOSIUM: On rethinking our god conflict**

Faith and psychology have had an interesting relationship throughout much of psychology’s relatively short history. One father figure in psychology portrayed religion as “the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity” (Freud, 1927/1961, p. 43), yet another, William James, was much less condescending as implied by his works, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (1902) and *The Will to Believe and Other Essays* (1897). Many would argue that psychology’s relationship with faith has become more productive in recent years with several lines of research exploring the mental health benefits of spirituality (Griffin, 2000; Murphy, 1990; Russell, 2002; Wacome, 2003). However, other scholars (Slife, Reber, 2009; Slife, Reber & Lefevor, 2012; Slife, Stevenson, & Wendt, 2010) warn that this recent trend to integrate spiritual techniques and interventions into a mainstream psychology that assumes God is not necessary, has left us with a psychology that continues to not take God seriously.

In any case, most would agree that there continues to exist a tension between faith and psychology. How does this tension play out when psychologists come to the laboratory or the therapy room with their own unique faith orientations and attitudes toward faith? This symposium will consist of a discussion about how two individuals of different faith orientations, at different points in their career, make sense of this tension between faith and psychology.

**Benefits of a Thoroughgoing Theistic Approach to Psychology**

*Chauncy T. Brinton, James Madison University*

This presentation will explore the benefits of what Slife, Reber and Lefevor (2012) have called a thoroughgoing theistic approach to psychology, an approach where God is at least...
postulated in all aspects of psychology. I will describe my journey as a devout Christian in a secular psychology training environment. My deeply held beliefs and the beliefs of many I know, including my clients, are that God is actively involved in our lives and that He is necessary for our spiritual and physical well-being. Yet in the graduate psychology training environment I have learned that God, at least in any literal sense, is never taken into account in the mainstream research articles and theories I have been exposed to. This has not necessarily been surprising to me as I voluntarily enrolled in a secular program and was prepared to experience such cognitive dissonance. To manage this dissonance, I often resign myself to privately believing that God is behind the lawful order of psychology’s theories or privately wondering whether a client is suffering because of a poor relationship with God. However, at other times I find myself wondering whether God really does matter in human functioning? I am left asking, is this because psychology’s findings are evidence that God doesn’t matter, or because psychology’s preferred method and epistemology espouse a particular godless worldview that in and of itself is not proven? I believe it is the latter and will use this presentation to advocate for a secular psychology that embraces a plurality of method worldviews and epistemologies to include a thoroughgoing theistic worldview. I will argue that this will not only help ease tensions that believers (scientists, practitioners, and consumers alike) feel while practicing or using psychology’s services, but more importantly, will be good for the advancement of psychological science.

A Workable Conception of God for Psychological Science

Gregg Henriques, James Madison University

This presentation will explore the question of how psychologists might frame the relationship between religious conceptions of God and psychological science. First, it will be argued that literal conceptions of God are problematic because such conceptions fail to fit within the coherent conceptual network of psychological science. Thus, it will be argued that psychology appropriately defines “out” literal conceptions of God as being part of the system of psychological knowledge. That said, recent arguments from liberal theologians raise interesting possibilities for much greater rapprochement between psychology and religious conceptions than would be suggested by either the “new atheists” like Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris or by the field’s great icons, B. F. Skinner and Sigmund Freud who were openly hostile to religious thought. Specifically, the scholar Karen Armstrong (2009) has argued that it is a modern misconception to consider God as a literal entity that exists with concrete attributes. Armstrong has argued that most ancient religious leaders divided their knowledge systems into logos and mythos, whereby the former refers to factual states of the empirical world and the latter refers to ways of conceiving the cosmos via metaphor and possibility that lead to religious rituals and practices that provide the follower with a sense of purpose, connection and transcendence. God, in this view, is what individuals move toward as they experience transcendence realized by enacting religious practice. This view of God is much more compatible with modern psychological science and opens up many productive avenues, both for the psychology of religion and for psychotherapists working with spiritual issues. Psychology has historically adopted either a hostile attitude toward religion or there has been an awkward avoidance of the spiritual. Anderson’s approach might offer the field significant opportunities toward a more productive relationship.

Psychotherapies as language-games

Pavan Brar, York University

As indicated by research, different psychotherapies show to be generally equivalent in their efficacy (the dodo bird verdict). If differing psychotherapeutic methods can be said as having equal efficacy, then the theoretical foundations of each cannot be said as being more scientific and empirically justified than any other. This paper first focuses on how
Psychotherapies and their guiding theories are sociohistorical products, and argues that their central principles ought to be interpreted as reflecting aspects of the social milieu in which they were created, rather than natural-scientific descriptions of the mind and of the nature of psychopathology. In light of the sociohistorical dimensions of psychotherapy and its theories, as well as the implications of the dodo bird verdict, it will be argued that psychotherapies are instead social and linguistic practices—that is, different ‘language-games’—used to clarify the problems and experiences of those who seek help. The underlying theoretical apparatus of a given psychotherapy is thus not composed of empirical entities, but rather constitutes a specific mode of representation that is used as a communicative medium for the therapist and patient to use in order to conceptualized, articulate, and objectify subjective distress.

**Narrative and unfusable horizons, towards a deliberately interventionist moral psychology**

*Sam Gable, Lesley University; David Goodman, Harvard Medical School/Lesley University; Rachel Carbona, & David House, Lesley University*

Psychotherapies and their graduate-level training may be reframed as efforts in epistemological intervention, which demand the subject’s demonstrative conformity to theoretical languages of health, development and suffering. For example, in suicide prevention or anti-racism/multicultural competency curriculum, progress is often evidenced unilaterally as the patient or student’s adoption of ontologically particular language traditions and values. When examined, interventionist efforts disrupt moral sensibilities about agency and narrative, and demand the ethical consideration of practitioners: Who can be intervened upon? Does the intervention silence developmental and epistemological alternatives? Who is privileged with the role of intervener? In our presentation we examine sites of intervention in psychology as they engage with narrative and cultural-moral epistemologies, and provide methodological direction towards a more deliberately interventionist psychology. This approach is informed by the philosophical hermeneutics of Wilhelm Dilthey, Charles Taylor and Paul Ricoeur, as well as Jacques Derrida’s treatment of positive science, which destabilize epistemological certainty to expose the embedded and metaphysically scaffolded positioning of knowledge claims in the natural and human sciences. We also explore two potentially opposing discourses to an interventionist methodology, which are Black feminist sociology around issues of testimony, and critical anthropology surrounding what has been termed “ontological imperialism” (e.g., Navajo Nation vs. US Forest Service) in which legal and educational efforts impose colonial epistemologies in order to dominate or erase indigenous narratives.

This theoretical formulation is further explored through preliminary findings of our curriculum-based intervention into what has been called aversive racism and implicit race bias for therapists in graduate level training. Our approach moves from the universalizing emphasis on inter-ethnic common moral factors in moral psychology, and instead seeks to elucidate context-specific moral contradictions as they are presented by students through narrative exploration, and intervened upon in forums, experiential activities in the classroom and community, and critical pedagogy.

**Saturday, March 8, 9:30 a.m.**

**POSTER SESSION**

**Cinema and multi-layered structure of reality**

*Rachel Carbona, & David House, Lesley University*

In this paper, I aim to explore the representation of psychological reality in certain film styles vis-à-vis structural realism (SR), a scientific realist position known as the best of both worlds in philosophy of science. I am drawn to SR because it is not as idealistic as the extreme form of scientific realism known as realism or as illogical as the other extreme: antirealism. SR is a
middle ground that looks at the mathematical structure of reality, and in that sense it is formal. Also, it humbly tries to approximate reality as opposed to suggesting that one can have direct access to or no access at all to objective reality. In SR, two incompatible theories could imply the same structure regarding the object of study (e.g., light as vibrations) and have predictive power, but still differ in terms of representation; such was the case with the theory change from Fresnel’s equations to Maxwell’s equations (Chalmers, 1999, p. 244-245). It seems impossible to know the nature of the universe or its ontology independent of our minds; however, I am not a hardcore idealist either, but perhaps I am sympathetic to this view known as, poly-solipsism (Keiser, n.d.), that frames humans in my opinion as inter-idealists, who co-construct a shared reality. It is hard to write about reality without thinking about truth. Which theory of truth would contain SR? Perhaps a Neo-Kantian coherence theory of truth, wherein there is a noumenal world (objective reality) or the thing-itself, and a phenomenal world (subjective reality). How can we study the former objectively if we are entirely embedded in it? The latter is our interpretation of the former based on our limited senses as humans, but how reliable are we in terms of measuring reality, with or without scientific instruments? SR, as a Middle Way, looks at the structure of reality through the lenses of inter-subjectivity and inter-objectivity à la Werner Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, wherein an observer affects observed reality blurring the line between subject and object.

**Necessary containment: Belief, morality, and the good-enough theory**

*David A. House, Lesley University; David Goodman, Lesley University/ Harvard Medical School; C. Catherine Mellor, Abigail Collins, & Sam Gable, Lesley University*

The proposed poster will seek to examine the mechanisms by which clinicians come to adopt a theoretical perspective, and how that perspective influences the process of psychotherapy. The authors call into question the objective superiority of any one theoretical approach, arguing instead that it is the clinician’s relationship to that theory which is most deserving of our attention.

Utilizing the language of D.W. Winnicott (1971), the clinician’s relationship to theory will be explored as good-enough. When the clinician’s relationship to theory is good-enough, the theory creates a containment within which the clinician's true self may be expressed. The good-enough theory is also flexible in allowing for individual clinician to adapt and take risks within the theoretical framework. Such a theory becomes a mediator of the relational dynamics in psychotherapy without divorcing clinicians from an embodied relationship to their clients. The good-enough theory acts as a good-enough mother; it is always present, creating safety and protection while allowing the clinician to explore and grow.

The affinity toward a specific theoretical approach will also be framed as a process of belief (Rizzuto, 1981), and a determination of morality (Christopher, 1996). Theory will be understood as as an attempt to attribute causality by the determination of significant experiences. Differences between theoretical schools amount to disagreements over what the most significant experiences are for human beings, and how those experiences influence both individual and collective phenomenology. The belief in God will be utilized as the primary comparative analogy.

Understanding the good-enough theory in this way, clinicians are afforded great freedom in the selection of a theoretical organization; however, we must be concerned with the ethics of theory utilization in psychotherapy. It becomes important to recognize that the clinician’s belief is not sufficient justification for the theory’s clinical application. It must be ensured, to the best of one’s ability, that a theoretical perspective is not perpetuating oppressive societal structures, impinging upon client agency, or violating other ethical mandates of psychotherapists. The ethics of theoretical understanding in itself will also be examined (Freeman, 2000).
It is essential to recognize the most valuable offering of psychotherapy, that is: the psychotherapist. Regardless of any clinician’s theoretical beliefs, the therapeutic alliance becomes integral to a therapeutic success. Our most valuable gift is ourselves, contained by the security of belief in the good-enough theory. The proposed poster will include a short presentation of the argument, followed by a discussion with the audience.

**Reintegration and mattering: Post-deployment and veterans**  
*Richard E. La Fleur, University of West Georgia*  
This paper looks at the effects deployment has on soldiers and the difficulties they face in dealing with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Suicide and the impact of reintegration into civilian life through the concept of mattering. Many deployed service members create relationships born out of being a “band of brothers” deployed in a war zone and experience the power of peer relationships forged in dangerous situations of combat with members of military units (Scurfield & Platoni, 2013). However, when some soldiers’ transition home as veterans, they experience stress and anxiety which can lead to “being” marginalized (Moore & Kennedy, 2011). When an individual experiences a transition or life change, the potential exists for marginality. The purpose of this thesis is to provide valuable information to improve the transition from the war zone to civilian life and improve the mental wellness of veterans and their loved ones as they attempt to reconnect post-deployment.

The “need to matter” is a daily part of our lives. People need to sense that they belong; they matter to others; that others care and the orientation to fulfill the need of the other is present and they depend on others. In the context of veterans, the need to matter is even greater when they return from the combat deployment. They want to feel as though they still matter however the environment has now drastically changed. Mattering is defined by Rosenberg and McCullough, (1981) as, “the feeling that others depend upon us, are interested in us, are concerned with our fate, or experience us as an ego-extension” (p. 165). The sociologist Morris Rosenberg and his colleagues suggest that “mattering is a motive: the feeling that others depend on us, are interested in us, are concerned with our fate, or experience us as an ego-extension exercises a powerful influence on our actions” (Rosenberg and McCullough, 1981, p. 165).

**Psychology of authenticity: A phenomenological anastomosis of the experience of a transition to an authentic human life**  
*Kizito N. C. Okeke, University of West Georgia*  
This paper focuses on the phenomenon of human authenticity. Authenticity is an important phenomenon to humans because of the uniqueness of their being in comparison to other animals, and other beings. Humans are aware of their own awareness of their own being, and this awareness bestows upon human nature a special existence and prerogative not found in other animals. Humans can, therefore, wonder about their own being, the nature of their being, the end of their own being, and the meaning of their own being, and, the wonder continues through the span of human life. Human wonder can create an awareness of the temporality of life and an awareness of responsible being in the world, and these have implications for authenticity. The word, *authenticity*, has become a common parlance. It is not uncommon that it is so readily applied in different ways in everyday usage to mean simply to, “be yourself,” and if that phraseology to be yourself means to simply live in accordance with the promptings of the inner self that is both subjective and culture bound, then, it is a disservice to the true meaning of authenticity. I will briefly define authenticity as the ability to live an examined, responsible, and meaningful human life in accordance with the being of humans and towards self-transcendence (Heidegger, 1966; Lonergan, 1972; Frankl, 1962; Maslow, 1962). It is a difficult phenomenon to convey in words (Bugental, 1965), but it is readily perceived in our daily endeavors, in our relationships, and in our
everyday experiences. Hence, this project studies authenticity with a phenomenological paradigm to understand what it is like to transition from an inauthentic life to an authentic life.

I am specifically interested in an understanding of the meaningful structure that engenders an authentic human life, where a human consciously experiences a transition from an inauthentic life to an authentic life sequel to a significant life event. The wonder is on what it is like to experience a shift from a life not in concordance with the being of humans to a life that is in concordance with the being of humans. The meaningful structure that is a catalyst to such a transformation to an authentic human life can serve the purpose of formulating a guide to an authentic life, which I have titled “Psychology of Authenticity”.

The result of this study can be a valuable tool in empowering humans to live an authentic human life, to live with the conscious awareness of their mortality by accepting death as the possibility and absolute certainty of their existence, and live authentically towards death (Heidegger, 1962). Therefore, authenticity equips human with the quality of life to realize at any given situation that forces beyond their control can take everything away except one thing: the freedom to choose how one responds to the situation and make out meaning to live in any situation (Frankl, 1962). This call to live authentically towards death means to be attentive, to be intelligent, to be reasonable, and to be responsible in all dimensions of life (Lonergan, 1972). The result of this study can also be a valuable tool in evaluating mainstream psychology’s conceptualization of self-actualization, and in counseling and psychological therapies.

Engaging CTE in the lived experience of the athlete’s career transition

Gary Senecal, University of West Georgia

A worthwhile discussion has begun regarding the complex, elusive, and yet tragic phenomenon of the many difficulties of ex-NFL players in their post-football-into-retirement careers. The scientific community is left to make sense regarding the wide range of symptoms displayed by these former athletes and as human beings we are all faced with watching the lives of individuals who were once stars, role models, and heroes fall into oblivion. Awareness of depression, bipolar, and, in the most tragic cases, suicide, has appeared too concurrently, especially in last ten years. It has lead us all to question the games many of us love or at least are entertained by and whether or not the deeply ingrained fundamentals and nuances of the game are actually causing the psychological and emotional destruction and, ultimately, death of its performers.

What many of these players who have come forward with such vulnerability have expressed is a deep sense of no longer recognizing oneself as the individual they once were. Many have provided tearful and intimate offerings of the real lived experience of no longer feeling concert with the same being they once were as an athlete. Neuroscience and psychology acting as neuroscience has looked for the usual one-to-one causal brain link to provide explanation for this difficult and elusive phenomenon, arguing that brain trauma overtime causes a tauopathy known as CTE [chronic traumatic encephalopathy] and that CTE effects cognitive, social, and emotional behavior of the athlete over time.

Nonetheless, it is my belief that the work of phenomenological, existential, and humanistic psychology can provide a more nuanced and ultimately accurate insight into the difficulties of these competitive transitions. I plan to use the work of RD Laing to show a methodology proper to dealing with validating the subjective account of human experience is in dire need here. It is not enough to tell these individuals they ‘have a bad brain,’ similar to what we do with schizophrenic or psychotic patients. It is instead more important to validate the nuances of the experience of the individual and try to investigate the lived meanings and coherent structures in this experience of their own shift in subjectivity. Lastly, in order to investigate potential causes of this phenomenon, I will examine the work of Michael Murphy
to provide a theoretical framework. Murphy writes extensively regarding the experience of transcendence occurring in competition. I will argue that the potential loss of these experiences, the real embodied magic of competition, after one’s competitive career ends may have a real presence in the difficult transitions these athletes make when they can no longer compete. Looking at how to recapture this ‘embodied magic’ may also have a deeply therapeutic effect for these athletes.

An exploration of theories of legitimization through discussions on sexual orientation

Christina L. Wright, University of West Georgia

The psychology of legitimacy is an area of psychological theory that attempts to understand how individuals legitimate or justify beliefs or behaviors that are unpopular, counter-intuitive, or discriminatory (Zelditch, Jr., 2001). Jost and Major (2001) note that social inequality rests on legitimacy for its justification and acceptance. A variety of theories further explicate various psychological processes that aid in the legitimization of unequal treatment of individuals or groups. These include moral exclusion theory (Opotow, 1990), social dominance theory (Sidanius, Levin, Federico & Pratto, 2001), and attribution of controllability (Weiner, Perry & Magnusson, 1988). These theoretical explanations of the justification of beliefs and actions to justify social inequality have received minimal attention in empirical research. This paper will consider these theories through an empirical study on how individuals justify decisions on issues related to sexual orientation.

Saturday, March 8, 11:00 a.m.

SYMPOSIUM: Bridging psychology and the humanities in the classroom: A response to STEM education

Joseph Ostenson, Chair, University of Tennessee at Martin
Ed Gantt, Discussant, Brigham Young University

As psychology continues to move further from its roots in philosophy, its attempts to align itself with the hard sciences have led to other movements – academic and otherwise – away from disciplines more traditionally associated with the liberal arts. These movements were all but institutionalized with APA’s push in 2010 for psychology to be adopted as a STEM discipline. Unfortunately, in moving away from the humanities, psychology is joining the larger push throughout higher education to value the hard sciences and technical disciplines above the humanistic. This emphasis threatens to undermine one of the original purposes of higher education – encouraging democracy and civil discourse – by encouraging a consumer culture that knows little more than how to make and spend money (Giroux, 2002). One response to this corporatization of higher education has come from the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, who recently released a report calling for the unity of the humanities and social sciences in an effort to restore the traditional purposes of higher education and help foster a broadly literate population. This symposium attempts to answer that call by discussing what this unity might mean practically for both the humanities and the social sciences. Glass will begin by discussing how the humanities are amplified by the historically human-focused elements of psychology; Merwin will then discuss how literature can help us combat reductionism in the psychology classroom; and finally, Bradshaw will discuss how stories can help make our students less objectifying and more sensitive to the human experience.

"The demons that inhabit the human breast": Psycho-analysis in Virgil and the English Classroom

John Glass, University of Tennessee at Martin

In Book VII of The Aeneid, Queen Amata—distraught over the news that Aeneas is to be her future son-in-law—becomes the unwitting victim of the Fury Allecto. Allecto, siezing on the
queen’s distress, turns her grief into fury, and Amata into a raving Bacchante. This paper will focus on some of the most obvious ways that Freud’s analyses of hysteria can be used to make sense of Amata’s transformation and bring aspects of Psychology into the English classroom. Then, drawing on the example from The Aeneid, the paper will comment on the relevance and complementarity of the humanities and social sciences and suggest some possibilities for cooperative efforts that can help promote and preserve the essential work of helping students gain insight into the human condition.

**Rescue 911: How Literature Can Save Psychology Students from Neuroscience and Further Compartmentalization**

*Michelle Merwin, University of Tennessee at Martin*

In modern psychology classes, the psyche is compartmentalized into segmented and sovereign neurotransmitters, brain imaging speculations, and contrived social experiments. To help the students transcend this reductionism, I use a short story that leaves the reader with a more general understanding of the experience of depression, a powerful and emotionally charged ending, and more questions than answers. Gail Godwin’s *A Sorrowful Woman* describes a woman’s puzzling entanglement with depression. This sorrowful woman outwardly appears to have it all: a caring and doting husband; affluence; few responsibilities beyond a lively 3 year old. All these things should be in her favor yet somehow seem to work against her. This sorrowful woman approaches and avoids her family, her world, her life, only to become more isolated and alienated from others and self. After completing a whirlwind of domestic activities, she commits suicide. In narrative form, Godwin captures the complexities of a disorder that can sometimes seem as simple as its symptoms.

In this presentation I will discuss how this story, and literature in general, can support our understanding of a psychological phenomenon such as depression, bringing to life psychological symptomology, providing useful context along with the nuances and subtleties of the phenomenon. Furthermore, as I will demonstrate with Godwin, skilled writing can often leave the observer of such phenomena in a state of mystery and wonder, which can help convince the students of depression’s ambiguity and irreducibility. Above all, I will argue that using such literature can move the students wholly through the human experience of depression, furthering empathy and compassion.

**Mental Disorders and Aesthetics: Franz Kafka’s and Charlotte Perkins Gillman’s Literary Prognosis for Depression**

*Charles Bradshaw, University of Tennessee at Martin*

A recent study (Young, et. al. 2012) in the journal *Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts* notes a greater probability for high-school age students to suffer thought-disorder and depression-related symptoms if they are involved in after-school artistic endeavors during high school, adding to a body of research that gives insight into some of the clinical manifestations of adolescent creative endeavor. This particular study seeks to forge a connection between aesthetic sensibility and depression so that authors can “better understand both artistic behavior and psychopathology.” What can the humanities offer such a study besides being the object of scientific inquiry? Through the use of short fiction, literary analysis can present a nuanced view of the terms by which “depression” is defined and an empathetic view of the aesthetically sensitive subject.

As an English professor, I often teach two canonized short stories (Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper” and Franz Kafka’s “A Hunger Artist”) that chronicle the development of what might be termed depressive conditions, and students often want to know what “illness” each protagonist suffers from. After some class conjecture and even some reference to the *DSM*, I try to lead them away from the objectification of the clinical subject toward an examination of how these stories use the protagonists’ illnesses to expand our understanding of the human experience. In these stories the narrative presents to the
Can psychology be both unified and multicultural?

Jordan Hyde, Brigham Young University

Multiculturalism and unification are both values that seem to be indispensable to the field of psychology. Fowers and Richardson (1996) argue that understanding and respecting cultural differences is necessary for psychology to truly be “a science of human [as opposed to a particular group’s] behavior” (p. 610) and to avoid becoming a repository of group-based inequities. Unification is also indispensable because if fragmentation in the discipline becomes too widespread, the term “psychology” will become impossibly ambiguous if not ultimately meaningless.

Although both multiculturalism and unification are essential, there is often tension between them. For example, there is considerable unification at the level of method—psychology is, by almost all definitions, “grounded in science” (American Psychological Association, Definition of “Psychology” section, para. 1). Williams (2005) argues that the scientific method is one particular instantiation of human reason, which is shaped by a particular intellectual history. Further, because mind (including reason) and culture are co-constituted (Markus et al., 1996) and because a group’s history is essential to its culture (Nisbett, 2003, pp. 29-45; Shweder, 2003, p. 349), the general unification in the use of the scientific method favors one cultural tradition over others. Thus, at the level of method there is greater unification and less multiculturalism.

By contrast, applied psychologists (such as psychotherapists) are strongly encouraged to be as multicultural as possible in their practices (Fowers & Richardson, 1996, p. 609). Not surprisingly, many different approaches to psychotherapy flourish. Although there are general standards of rigor in applied psychology, there seems to be more emphasis on multiculturalism and less on unification at the level of application.

In addition to its effects on various levels of the field, the tension between multiculturalism and unification sometimes requires cultural compartmentalization on the part of psychologists. For example, as Slife and Reber (2009) argue, the widespread acceptance of the hidden assumptions of naturalism in psychology has led to an implicit bias against theism. This bias requires psychologists from theistic cultural groups to compartmentalize their native cultural worldviews in order to fully participate in the discipline.

As psychologists are entering the field from increasingly diverse cultural backgrounds, it is becoming especially important to address challenges that arise from the tension between these two important values. Rather than arguing only one perspective on this issue, I invite discussion on the following questions: In what areas of the discipline is there room for more cultural variety and less unity? In what areas is unity more critical, even if it means that some cultural perspectives are favored over others? What, if anything, can be done to retain the benefits of both multiculturalism and unity at all levels of the discipline? I conclude by suggesting, as one possibility for future discussions, a two-tiered psychology (adapted from a political system described by Shweder, 2003) that may best serve to maximize both multiculturalism and unity throughout the discipline.
An integrative meta-theoretical framework for psychology
Gregg Henriques, James Madison University

Pluralism is inevitable and is a feature of all scientific disciplines, including physics and biology, and is, to a degree, a feature of knowledge systems to be celebrated. Monolithic notions are most likely the function of inflexible and authoritarian structures that prevent healthy diversity and free inquiry. However, instead of being in a healthy state of pluralism, Psychology exists currently in a state of fragmented pluralism, and the nature of the confusion and degrees of difference in semantic meanings of terms, paradigms, and the identities of psychologists is qualitatively more diverse, chaotic and fragmented than found in the more mature disciplines like biology and physics, and these problems result in serious difficulties for the field of psychology to advance as a knowledge system. I have characterized this fragmented state as “the problem of psychology” (Henriques, 2008; 2011), which refers to the fact that the field has historically resisted a clear definition and subject matter, but at the same time it connects deeply to the natural sciences, the social sciences and the humanities.

I argue that the reason for the fragmentation is the absence of an integrative meta-theoretical frame that can offer psychologists a way to effectively conceive of its subject matter, defined its place in the pantheon of knowledge, and clarify the identities of psychologists in general (Henriques, 2013). This talk will introduce a new meta-theoretical system that defines the field of psychology, explains why there are three great branches of the discipline that correspond to its historical identity as a natural science, a social science, and a health profession, and explain how it provides a framework for the field to move from its current state of conceptual confusion to a more integrated and conceptually clear vision for the field. It will be noted that this integrative meta-theoretical framework simultaneously offers a bedrock of understanding, yet does not imprison future psychologists in a limiting way, but instead sets the stage for psychology to be grounded in an integrated pluralism, much as Mitchell (2002) argued was appropriate for biology.
Visitor Information

Welcome to Atlanta, to the STPP's Midwinter Meeting of 2014, and welcome to Buckhead!

As a visitor and attendee of Division’s 24’s Mid-Winter, your main interest, we are sure, is reconnaissance with colleagues and intellectual and collegial exchange. However, should you have a moment to sightsee or eat, here are some suggestions.

Getting around: Cabs will be available at the airport or the hotel, or you may call Buckhead Safety Cab at 404-875-3777 or 404-233-1152. You can also take the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, called MARTA. At the airport, follow the signs to its station and take the red line to the Buckhead station, which is a short walk to Embassy Suites. Hours of operation and dreadfully clear instructions can be found at the MARTA website (http://www.itsmarta.com). You’ll want information about rail service.

Eating: There are a number of walking distance restaurants, some of which are listed below. Further away, you can find Indian and Vietnamese, a nationally ranked Chinese restaurant. All are a car ride or cab fare. Little Szechuan is very well known, Saigon Café, and Com Grill serve excellent Vietnamese cuisine. There are some good Korean restaurants nearby; we would need to check our sources for those. There are several good Indian Restaurants in the neighborhoods of little Five Points and Decatur, as well as a couple Pubs in the same neighborhoods. About ¾ mile south of the hotel you’ll find Fado Irish Pub.

Shopping and Sightseeing: A few blocks from the hotel is Lenox Square, a shopping mall of relative fame. Farther down across from the Ritz Carlton is Phipps Plaza, where you can find great shopping and good eating. Also within walking distance of the hotel is the Atlanta History Museum, with interesting exhibits about Atlanta, the South and the Civil War.

And we would advise anyone visiting Atlanta to take a cab or get a ride to the MLK Centre and Museum. It is in the Sweet Auburn area. Nearby there is the Municipal Market, which has several restaurants and is an old style market. The MLK area is still a little dicey but rich in history, if you have an afternoon where you might enjoy an outing.

But as you are there to be at the conference, we will leave the temptations at that. There will be a number of natives at the meeting. Please feel free to ask us about the area and how to get there and here.

We all look forward to your arrival and the conference which I know will enliven us all...

My best wishes from home base committee:

*Karen Malone, Jonathan Gibson, Christina Wright, Chase O’Gwin, Lisa Osbeck*
RESTAURANT LIST

**Bistro Niko:** French Style / Seafood / Chicken / Steak: $20-$30 plate
3344 Peachtree Road

**Flying Biscuit:** Breakfast / Sandwiches / Turkey Steak / $7-$15 plate
3280 Peachtree Rd NE #145

**Twist:** Spanish inspired Tapas / steaks / seafood / $6 - $30 plate(s)
3500 Peachtree Rd NE

**Cheese Cake Factory:** Wide variety / $10 - $25 plate
3024 Peachtree Rd

**The Tavern @ Phipps:** Sandwiches / Salads / Steaks / Chicken / Seafood / $12 - $30 plate
3500 Peachtree Rd NE

**Ruth’s Chris Steak House:** Guess / $40 - $50 plate
3285 Peachtree Rd NE

**Buckhead Pizza Co:** $7 - $11 personal pizza / $17 -$24 Large pizza
3324 Peachtree Rd

**Cantina Taqueria & Tequila Bar:** Mexican Food $4 - $15 plate
3280 Peachtree Rd NE #150

**Southern Art:** Southern Inspired Food & Bourbon bar / $15 - $30
3315 Peachtree Rd NE

**Maggiano’s:** Italian / $11 - $30
3368 Peachtree Rd NE